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IN RE EXXON VALDEZ:




This Article examines the application of due process restraints on
punitive damages as articulated by the United States Supreme
Court, in the context of the $5 billion punitive damage award
stemming from the Exxon Valdez oil spill.  The author asserts that
the Exxon Valdez punitive damages case and its extensive appel-
late history demonstrate the practical application problems that
have arisen under the Supreme Court’s due process analysis of
punitive damages awards.  The author concludes that the Supreme
Court’s due process review of punitive damages awards has failed
to produce predictability and uniformity in such awards and will
likely be followed by additional guidelines to be set forth by the
Court in future cases.
I.  INTRODUCTION
On March 24, 1989, the supertanker Exxon Valdez ran
aground on Bligh Reef and spilled approximately eleven million
gallons of oil into Prince William Sound.1  Wind, ocean currents,
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1. Doug O’Harra, Sound Battles Back, But Threats Linger; Exxon Valdez –
Legacy of a Spill, ANCHORAGE DAILY NEWS, Mar. 21, 1999, at 1M.
111103 CHAMBERS.DOC 12/29/03  2:00 PM
196 ALASKA LAW REVIEW [20:2
and tidal action spread the oil until it eventually covered more than
thirteen-hundred miles of the Alaskan coastline and caused severe
environmental, social, and economic damage.2  The Exxon Corpo-
ration conducted a cleanup operation aimed at removing the oil
from the shore, spending over $2.1 billion in the effort.3  In addi-
tion, Exxon initiated a claims settlement program, voluntarily
paying out $300 million to compensate those persons who were
economically harmed by the spill.4  However, the spill precipitated
numerous lawsuits which were filed in both state and federal court
by both public and private litigants.5
In In re Exxon Valdez, commercial and subsistence fishermen,
landowners, and others harmed by the oil spill filed a class action
suit to recover economic damages.6  Exxon admitted that its negli-
gence had caused the oil spill; however, the jury found that Exxon
had been reckless, which opened the door to liability for punitive
damages.7  In September 1994, the jury delivered a $5 billion puni-
2. Doug O’Harra, Researchers Track Crude’s Wandering Trail; Spread of Oil
from the Exxon Valdez, ANCHORAGE DAILY NEWS, Mar. 21, 1999, at 5M; Exxon
Valdez Oil Spill Trustee Council, Oil Spill Facts: Spill Prevention and Response, at
http://www.oilspill.state.ak.us/facts/prevention.html (last visited on Sept. 22, 2003).
3. Exxon Valdez Oil Spill Trustee Council, Oil Spill Facts: Questions and An-
swers, at http://www.oilspill.state.ak.us/facts/qanda.html (last visited on Sept. 22,
2003). In this Article, “Exxon” refers collectively to the Exxon Corporation and
Exxon Shipping Company.  Exxon Shipping Company was renamed Sea River
Shipping.  Id.  The Exxon Valdez was renamed the Sea River Mediterrranean. Id.
A provision of the Oil Pollution Act of 1990 bars any vessel which has spilled
more than one million gallons of oil after March 22, 1989 from Prince William
Sound—a provision which was obviously written to include the Exxon Valdez. See
33 U.S.C. § 2737 (1994).  In 1999, Exxon merged with Mobil to become Exxon-
Mobil, one of the largest private oil companies in the world.  Exxon Mobil Corpo-
ration Announces New Global Structure, PR NEWSWIRE, Dec. 2, 1999.
4. In re Exxon Valdez, 270 F.3d 1215, 1223 (9th Cir. 2001) [hereinafter Exxon
II].  Exxon I refers to the jury trial verdict awarding $5 billion in punitive damages
award.
5. Robert E. Jenkins & Jill Watry Kastner, Running Aground in a Sea of
Complex Litigation: A Case Comment On the Exxon Valdez Litigation, 18 UCLA
J. ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 151, 155-59 (2000) (“The Exxon Valdez litigation began
with more than 52,000 plaintiffs and 84 law firms filing more than 200 suits in both
state and federal court in the first year alone . . . . [B]y September 1991, 252 pri-
vate lawsuits were filed seeking a total of $59 billion.”).
6. Exxon II, 270 F.3d at 1225.
7. Id.
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tive damages verdict against Exxon.8  At the time, the award was
the largest in United States history.9
In November 2001, the United States Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit vacated the $5 billion punitive damages jury verdict
and directed the district court to reduce the award on remand.10
Specifically, the Ninth Circuit held that while punitive damages
were permissible, the $5 billion award was so large that it deprived
Exxon of fair notice that such a large verdict could be imposed, and
was therefore excessive under the Due Process Clause.11  In its
holding, the court relied upon two recent decisions of the United
8. Jenkins & Kastner, supra note 5, at 192.
9. 270 F.3d at 1238; Jenkins & Kastner, supra note 5, at 192.  The $5 billion
award against Exxon does not seem quite so shocking in comparison to the July
2000 award of $144 billion in the Florida class action suit against cigarette manu-
facturers. See infra note 27.  For a description of the due process excessiveness is-
sues raised in the Florida tobacco litigation, see Virginia A. Canipe, Crossing the
Excessiveness Line: The Implications of BMW v. Gore On Multi-Billion Dollar
Tobacco Litigation Punitive Damages, 36 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1157 (2001).  See
also Meghan A. Crowley, From Punishment to Annihilation: Engle v. R.J. Rey-
nolds Tobacco Co.—No More Butts—Punitive Damages Have Gone Too Far, 34
LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1513 (2001).
10. Exxon II, 270 F.3d at 1246-47.
11. See id. at 1238-47 (discussing constitutional due process requirements
stipulating that punitive damages awards cannot be so grossly excessive as to deny
fair notice).  For an explanation of the Due Process Clause and the distinction be-
tween the procedural and substantive due process rights implicated by punitive
damages awards, see ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES
AND POLICIES (1997), stating:
The Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments, respectively, provide that nei-
ther the United States nor state governments shall deprive any person
“of life, liberty, or property without due process of law.”  This clause has
been interpreted as imposing two separate limits on government, usually
called “procedural due process” and “substantive due process.”
Procedural due process, as the phrase implies, refers to the procedures
that the government must follow before it deprives a person of life, lib-
erty, or property . . . .
Substantive due process, as that phrase connotes, asks whether the gov-
ernment has an adequate reason for taking away a person’s life, liberty,
or property . . .
[An] example of the distinction between procedural and substantive due
process can be found in challenges to large punitive damage awards.
Procedural due process requires that there be safeguards such as instruc-
tions to the jury to guide their discretion, and judicial review to assure
the reasonableness of the awards.  Substantive due process prevents ex-
cessive punitive damages awards, regardless of the procedures followed.
 Id. at 419-20.
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States Supreme Court—BMW of North America, Inc. v. Gore12 and
Cooper Industries, Inc. v. Leatherman Tool Group, Inc.,13 which to-
gether established criteria for judicial review of jury awards for pu-
nitive damages.  The Ninth Circuit concluded: “The $5 billion puni-
tive damages award is too high to withstand the review we are
required to give it under BMW and Cooper.  It must be reduced.”14
In December 2002, the district court on remand remitted $1
billion of the punitive damages award.15  While the district court
acknowledged that it had to reduce the award, it nonetheless re-
jected the Ninth Circuit’s conclusion that the original award was
excessive under the Due Process Clause.16  Instead, the district
court found that the “award was justified by the facts of the case
and is not grossly excessive so as to deprive Exxon of fair notice—
its right to due process.”17
Exxon appealed to the Ninth Circuit, challenging the district
court’s decision to set the punitive damages award at $4 billion.  On
August 18, 2003, before the parties even submitted appellate briefs,
the Ninth Circuit vacated the district court’s judgment and re-
manded the case so that the district court could reconsider its deci-
sion in light of State Farm Automobile Insurance Company v.
Campbell,18 decided by the Supreme Court in April of 2003.19  Be-
fore the end of 2003, the parties will submit briefs and present oral
arguments to the district court regarding whether State Farm re-
quires a greater reduction in the punitive damages award.20
The focus of this Article is the application of the Supreme
Court’s recently identified due process constraints on punitive
damages awards in In re Exxon Valdez.  First, Part II will review
the Supreme Court’s emerging substantive due process “fair notice
12. 517 U.S. 559 (1996).  While the Ninth Circuit and the district court of
Alaska use “BMW” as shorthand when referring to the case, some courts—most
notably the  Supreme Court—often refer to the case as “Gore.”  This Article uses
“BMW” as shorthand.
13. 532 U.S. 424 (2001).
14. Exxon II, 270 F.3d at 1246.




18. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 123 S. Ct. 1513 (2003).
19. Sea Hawk Seafoods, Inc. v. Exxon Corp., No. 03-35166, at 1 (9th Cir. Aug.
18, 2003) (Order) [hereinafter Exxon IV].
20. In re Exxon Valdez, No. A89-0095-CV, at 2 (D. Alaska Aug. 26, 2003)
(Order for Further Proceedings on Punitive Damages Award) [hereinafter Exxon
V].
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excessiveness” jurisprudence regarding punitive damages awards
culminating in BMW, Cooper, and State Farm.
Next, Part III will summarize the background of In re Exxon
Valdez.  This Part will describe the spill and its aftermath, including
Exxon’s $2.1 billion clean-up effort.  In addition, Part III will dis-
cuss the civil and criminal penalties imposed on Exxon after the
spill.  Part III will also summarize the spill-related litigation rele-
vant to In re Exxon Valdez, including the $900 million settlement
Exxon paid to government trustees to compensate for the damages
done to public natural resources, as well as a failed class action suit
filed by outdoor recreation enthusiasts seeking to recover damages
for their lost use of natural resources.
Part IV will summarize the parties’ arguments on the substan-
tive due process challenge to the punitive damages award con-
tained in their briefs to the Ninth Circuit and the district court.
Part IV will then discuss the Ninth Circuit’s decision to vacate the
verdict based on its analysis of BMW’s “fair notice excessiveness”
guideposts and remand the case to the district court with instruc-
tions to reduce the punitive damages award.  Next, Part IV will ex-
amine the district court’s decision to reduce the punitive damages
award against Exxon by $1 billion.  Finally, Part IV will discuss the
Ninth Circuit’s order that vacated the reduced award and re-
manded the case so that the district court could reconsider the pu-
nitive damages award in light of State Farm.
Part V will discuss the following questions regarding due proc-
ess excessiveness review that were raised by In re Exxon Valdez:
(1) Do BMW’s guideposts lead to uniformity?; (2) Is de novo re-
view appropriate?; (3) Does excessiveness review needlessly un-
dermine the role of the jury?; (4) Should additional guideposts be
considered?; and (5) Should a defendant’s expenses be used to
mitigate the amount of punitive damages?  This Article concludes
that application of due process excessiveness review does not lend
itself to uniformity and that the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence will
require additional guidelines in order to settle the various prob-
lematic issues.  In addition, Part V will discuss two important,
evolving issues—extraterritoriality and multiple punishments—that
were not raised by In re Exxon Valdez, but which have led the Su-
preme Court to further constrain punitive damages awards in State
Farm.
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II.  PUNITIVE DAMAGES AWARDS & SUBSTANTIVE DUE
PROCESS “FAIR NOTICE EXCESSIVENESS” CHALLENGES
A.  Punitive Damages Awards
While compensatory damages are meant only to compensate
the plaintiff for actual loss or injury, the aim of punitive damages is
to disgorge from the defendant “any profit gained through miscon-
duct and to inflict a financial harm . . . sufficiently severe to dis-
suade the defendant and others from engaging in the conduct at is-
sue.”21  In other words, punitive damages are awarded “to punish
reprehensible conduct and to deter its future occurrence.”22  They
have been described as “private fines levied by civil juries.”23  By
the nineteenth century these fines had become a “well-established
principle of the common law” and were sanctioned by the Supreme
Court in Day v. Woodworth.24  However, even then they proved
controversial.25  Indeed, Chief Justice Rehnquist once observed
that “the doctrine of punitive damages has been vigorously criti-
cized throughout the Nation’s history.”26
During the past decade, the perception among some observers
that out-of-control juries frequently award plaintiffs ever-
increasing punitive damages has sparked a movement for tort re-
form.27  Other observers contend that the punitive damages crisis is
21. Daniel M. Weddle, A Practitioner’s Guide to Litigating Punitive Damages
After BMW of North America, Inc. v. Gore, 47 DRAKE L. REV. 661, 662 (1999).
22. Bankers Life & Cas. Co. v. Crenshaw, 486 U.S. 71, 87 (1988) (O’Connor,
J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) (quoting Gertz v. Robert
Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 350 (1974)).
23. Gertz, 418 U.S. at 350.
24. 54 U.S. (13 How.) 363, 371 (1851).
25. Id. (acknowledging the controversial nature of punitive damages awards,
but accepting them as a longstanding fixture of the common law).
26. Smith v. Wade, 461 U.S. 30, 58 (1983) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
27. See Victor E. Schwartz, Mark A. Behrens & Joseph P. Mastrosimone,
Reining in Punitive Damages “Run Wild”: Proposals for Reform By Courts And
Legislatures, 65 BROOK. L. REV. 1003, 1010, 1034-35 (1999) (arguing that reform is
needed to address the chilling effect of punitive damages awards and recom-
mending legislation and judicial constraints on punitive damages awards); see also
George L. Priest, The Problem and Efforts to Understand It, in PUNITIVE
DAMAGES: HOW JURIES DECIDE 1 (2002) (“Over the past two decades, our coun-
try has experienced a dramatic increase in the incidence and magnitude of puni-
tive damages verdicts rendered by juries in civil litigation.  Perhaps the most ex-
traordinary example is the July 2000 award of $144.8 billion in the Florida class
action brought against cigarette manufacturers.  But there are many other exam-
ples of huge verdicts . . . .”); Crowley, supra note 9, at 1515, 1531 (describing an
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a politically-driven myth based upon anecdotal evidence derived
only from a few well-known outlier cases.28  Nonetheless, many
state legislatures have responded to calls for tort reform by passing
legislation curtailing punitive damages awards.29  In addition, state
courts are increasingly receptive to constitutional challenges to pu-
nitive damages awards and have articulated factors—similar to
those contained in BMW—designed to facilitate judicial review and
control of punitive damages awards.30
increase in punitive damages awards against corporate defendants and suggesting
reforms to “restore balance, fairness, and predictability to punitive damages law”).
28. See, e.g., Theodore Eisenberg, Damage Awards in Perspective: Behind The
Headline-Grabbing Awards in Exxon Valdez and Engle, 36 WAKE FOREST L.
REV. 1129, 1134–39 (2001) (showing no significant increase in punitive damages
awards between 1991 and 1996); Lori Woodward O’Connell, The Case for Con-
tinuing to Award Punitive Damages, 36 TORT & INS. L. J. 873, 883-89 (2001) (ar-
guing that punitive damages awards are not increasing in number or frequency
and are not excessively high or unpredictable); Marc Galanter, Real World Torts:
An Antidote to Anecdote, 55 MD. L. REV. 1093, 1112-40 (1996) (refuting general
claims of a nationwide punitive damages crisis); Michael Rustad, Nationalizing
Tort Law: The Republican Attack on Women, Blue Collar Workers and Consum-
ers, 48 RUTGERS L. REV. 673, 687-704 (1996) (concluding that there is no empiri-
cal evidence of an emerging punitive damages crises); Richard C. Reuben, Plain-
tiffs Rarely Win Punitives, Study Says, 81 A.B.A. J. 26, 26 (Oct. 1995) (describing a
Department of Justice study that revealed that juries awarded punitive damages to
plaintiffs in only six percent of the cases they won, and awarded more than
$50,000 in only half of those cases); Michael Rustad & Thomas Koenig, The His-
torical Continuity of Punitive Damages Awards: Reforming the Tort Reformers, 42
AM. U. L. REV. 1269 (1993)  (refuting a punitive damages crisis and affirming
positive functions of punitive damages); Stephen Daniels & Joanne Martin, Myth
and Reality in Punitive Damages, 75 MINN. L. REV. 1, 39-43 (1990) (refuting claim
of nationwide punitive damages problem).
29. BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 614-19 (1996) (Ginsburg, J.,
dissenting) (providing an appendix to the dissenting opinion listing legislation
from sixteen states, which curtails punitive damages awards by various methods
including: “(1) caps on awards; (2) provisions for payments of sums to state agen-
cies rather than to plaintiffs; and (3) mandatory bifurcated trials with separate
proceedings for punitive determinations”).
30. Although critical of the result, Justice Breyer’s description of the Alabama
Supreme Court’s review of the punitive damages award in BMW v. Gore provides
an example of how one state has actively developed methods for the judicial re-
view of punitive damages. BMW, 517 U.S. at 586-93 (Breyer, J. concurring); see
also infra notes 135-152 and accompanying text discussing the factors the Utah
Supreme Court applied in State Farm.
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B. The Pre-BMW Decisions of the United States Supreme Court
While BMW, Cooper, and State Farm are correctly regarded as
landmark federal decisions, the Supreme Court had begun to iden-
tify constitutional constraints on punitive damages awards as early
as 1986.  In these cases, the Court heard constitutional challenges
to awards and expressed concern that excessive punitive damages
awards jeopardized constitutional rights.  However, the Court fell
short of imposing constitutional constraints to actually reduce puni-
tive damages.
In Aetna Life Insurance Co. v. Lavoie,31 while the punitive
damages award was set aside on other grounds, the Supreme Court
noted that the constitutionality of punitive damages raised “impor-
tant issues which, in an appropriate setting, must be resolved.”32
Similarly, in Bankers Life & Casualty Co. v. Crenshaw,33 the Su-
preme Court did not reach the constitutional challenge to a puni-
tive damages award because the issue had not been properly raised
in the state court.34  In a concurring opinion, however, Justice
O’Connor expressed the view that unrestricted jury discretion over
punitive damages awards presented “serious” procedural due proc-
ess problems.35  Additionally, in Browning-Ferris Industries of
Vermont, Inc. v. Kelco Disposal, Inc.,36 the Supreme Court held
that the Excessive Fines Clause of the Eighth Amendment “does
not constrain an award of [punitive] damages in a civil suit.”37
However, the Court reserved the question of whether the Due Pro-
cess Clause is a constraint on jury discretion over punitive damages
awards even in the absence of statutory limits.38
In 1991, the Supreme Court stated for the first time that the
Due Process Clause imposes a limit on punitive damages awards.39
In Pacific Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. Haslip,40 the Court sought
to determine “whether the Due Process Clause render[ed] the pu-
31. 475 U.S. 813 (1986).
32. Id. at 816, 828-29.
33. 486 U.S. 71 (1988).
34. Id. at  76-80.
35. Id. at 87-88 (O’Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judg-
ment).
36. 492 U.S. 257 (1989).
37. Id. at 263-64.
38. Id. at 276-77.
39. THEODORE OLSON, ET AL., CONSTITUTIONAL CHALLENGES TO PUNITIVE
DAMAGES AFTER BMW V. GORE 4 (George C. Landrith ed., 1998).
40. 499 U.S. 1 (1991).
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nitive damages award in [Haslip] constitutionally unacceptable.”41
To that end, the Court stated that “unlimited jury discretion . . . in
the fixing of punitive damages may invite extreme results that jar
one’s constitutional sensibilities.” 42  The Court ultimately upheld
the punitive damages award, finding that the award had an “under-
standable relationship to [the] compensatory damages.”43  The
Court also declined to “draw a mathematical bright line” for the
judicial review of punitive damages awards that would fit every
case, but stated that “general concerns of reasonableness and ade-
quate guidance from the court when the case is tried to a jury
properly enter into the constitutional calculus.”44  Thus, the Court
upheld a punitive damages award that was four times the amount
of the compensatory damages, stating that the award “may be close
to the line . . . [but] does not cross the line into the area of constitu-
tional impropriety.”45
In TXO Production Corp. v. Alliance Resources Corp.,46 the
Court upheld a punitive damages award while reiterating that “rea-
sonableness” is an important factor in determining whether a puni-
tive damages award is so “grossly excessive” that it violates the
Due Process Clause.47  TXO involved a bad faith advancement of a
quitclaim by the defendant, TXO, in an effort to renegotiate an oil
and gas royalty arrangement with the plaintiff.48  The Court upheld
a punitive to compensatory ratio of 526 to one in part because of
the malicious and fraudulent conduct.49  In a concurring opinion,
however, Justice Kennedy warned that “[a] case involving vicarious
liability, negligence, or strict liability might present different is-
sues.”50
Finally, in Honda Motor Co. v. Oberg,51 the Supreme Court
held that an Oregon law denying its courts the authority to reduce
or vacate excessive punitive damages awards violated the Due Pro-
cess Clause.52  The Court stated that “[j]udicial review of the size of
41. Id. at 18.
42. Id. at 18.
43. Id. at 22-24.
44. Id.
45. Id. at 23-24.
46. 509 U.S. 443 (1993).
47. Id. at 453, 458.
48. Id. at 447-49.
49. Id. at 453, 462.
50. Id. at 469 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judg-
ment).
51. 512 U.S. 415 (1994).
52. Id. at 434-35.
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punitive damages awards has been a safeguard against excessive
verdicts for as long as punitive damages have been awarded.”53
Together, these cases established the foundation for the Court’s
watershed decisions in BMW and Cooper.
C. BMW of North America, Inc. v. Gore: The Fair Notice Exces-
siveness Guideposts
In BMW of North America, Inc. v. Gore,54 the Supreme Court,
in a 5-4 decision, held that the amount of a punitive damages award
violated the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
because it was so excessive that the defendant did not have fair no-
tice that it would be imposed.55  The majority opinion articulated
the following three guideposts to be considered when a court de-
termines whether a punitive damages award is constitutionally ex-
cessive: (1) the reprehensibility of the defendant’s conduct; (2) the
ratio of the award to the harm inflicted on the plaintiff; and (3) the
difference between the award and the civil or criminal penalties
that could be imposed for comparable conduct.56  After applying
these guideposts to the facts, the Court vacated the punitive dam-
ages award and remanded the case to the Alabama Supreme
Court.57
In BMW, the plaintiff, Dr. Gore, purchased a new car from an
authorized dealer, only to discover later that the car had been par-
tially repainted by the national distributor, presumably after sus-
taining damage during transport.58  The defendant, BMW of North
America, had followed its practice of not disclosing pre-delivery
damage to dealers or customers when the cost of repair amounted
to less than three percent of the car’s retail price.59  In fact, the cost
of repainting the car purchased by Gore was about six hundred
dollars—only 1.5 percent of the retail price.60  BMW contended
that its non-disclosure policy was consistent with the laws of Ala-
bama and of other states, while Gore alleged that the failure to dis-
53. Id. at 421.
54. 517 U.S. 559 (1996).
55. Id. at 574-75. BMW has received significant attention from scholars and
the legal community.  See generally, OLSON, supra note 39; George C. Freeman,
Jr., Constitutional Constraints on Punitive Damages and Other Monetary Punish-
ments, 57 BUS. LAW. 587 (2002); Weddle, supra note 21, at 661; Sabrina C. Turner,
The Shadow of BMW of North America, Inc. v. Gore, WIS. L. REV. 427 (1998).
56. BMW, 517 U.S. at 575-85.
57. Id. at 585-86.
58. Id. at 563.
59. Id. at 563-64.
60. Id. at 564.
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close constituted suppression of a material fact amounting to
fraud.61
Gore brought suit in Alabama State Court and claimed actual
damages of four thousand dollars, asserting that this was the de-
crease in the value of the car as a result of the damage and re-
painting.62  To support his claim for punitive damages, Gore pre-
sented evidence that BMW had sold nearly one thousand cars
nationwide without disclosing similar repairs.63  Gore claimed $4
million in punitive damages—the estimate of actual damage of four
thousand dollars per car, multiplied by one-thousand cars.64  The
jury then found that BMW had defrauded Gore and found the dis-
tributor liable for four thousand dollars in compensatory dam-
ages.65  The jury also determined that BMW’s non-disclosure policy
constituted “gross, oppressive or malicious” fraud and awarded $4
million in punitive damages.66
On appeal, BMW claimed that the punitive damages award
was constitutionally excessive.67  This argument was rejected by the
Alabama Supreme Court, which applied a “fair notice excessive-
ness” inquiry68 based on a seven-factor test articulated in Green Oil
Co. v. Hornsby.69 The Alabama Supreme Court found BMW’s con-
duct reprehensible and concluded that the punitive damages award
had a “reasonable relationship” to the harm that had resulted from
BMW’s conduct.70  Nonetheless, the Alabama Supreme Court or-
dered a remittitur and cut the punitive damages award in half—to
$2 million—because it found that the jury had improperly relied
upon BMW’s acts outside of Alabama when determining the
amount of the award.71
61. Id. at 563-65.
62. Id. at 564.
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. Id. at 565.
66. Id.
67. Id. at 566.
68. Id.
69. 539 So. 2d 218, 223-24 (Ala. 1989).  Justice Breyer’s concurrence in BMW
lists the Green Oil factors that were part of the Alabama Supreme Court’s exces-
siveness inquiry, but argues that they were applied in a fashion that imposed little
actual constraint on the punitive damages.  BMW, 517 U.S. at 589.
70. BMW, 517 U.S. at 567.
71. Id.  Remittitur is a method by which a trial judge can review jury award for
excessiveness and order a new trial unless plaintiff accepts a reduction of the jury
award.  See also Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(a) (granting trial judges the power to amend
judgments).
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After BMW appealed, the United States Supreme Court
granted certiorari, stating: “we believed that a review of this case
would help illuminate ‘the character of the standard that will iden-
tify unconstitutionally excessive awards’ of punitive damages.”72  At
the outset of its opinion, the Supreme Court noted: “Punitive dam-
ages may properly be imposed to further a State’s (sic) legitimate
interests in punishing unlawful conduct and deterring its repeti-
tion.”73  The Court then described a state’s interest in prohibiting
deceptive trade practices.74 Next, the Court stated that while Con-
gress could enact a full disclosure requirement for the entire na-
tion, no single state could impose such a policy outside of its own
jurisdiction.75  This also means that “a state may not impose eco-
nomic sanctions on violators of its laws with the intent of changing
the tortfeasors’ lawful conduct in other States (sic).”76  The Court
thus concluded that Alabama lacked the authority to punish a party
through legislative fines or judicially imposed penalties for conduct
that occurred lawfully in another state and did not impact Alabama
or its residents.77  Therefore, the Court expressed approval of the
Alabama Supreme Court’s reduced punitive damages award that
was based only on BMW’s conduct in Alabama.78
The Supreme Court concluded, however, that even though the
reduced punitive damage award was based only on BMW’s conduct
in Alabama, it was still “grossly excessive.”79  This conclusion trig-
gered the Court’s own fair notice excessiveness inquiry: “[o]nly
when an award can fairly be categorized as ‘grossly excessive’ in
relation to these [state] interests [punishing unlawful conduct and
deterring its repetition] does it enter the zone of arbitrariness that
violates the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.”80
72. BMW, 517 U.S. at 568 (quoting Honda Motor Co. v. Oberg, 512 U.S. 415,
420 (1994)).
73. Id.  The Court then stated that:
In our federal system, States necessarily have considerable flexibility in
determining the level of punitive damages that they will allow . . . in any
particular case.  Most States . . . afford the jury similar latitude, requiring
only that the damages awarded be reasonably necessary to vindicate the
State’s legitimate interests in punishment and deterrence.
Id.
74. Id. at 568-70 (noting the “patchwork of rules” in existence throughout the
fifty states ranging from judicial processes to legislative acts).
75. Id. at 571.
76. Id. at 572.
77. Id. at 572-73.
78. Id. at 573-74.
79. Id. at 574.
80. Id. at 568.
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The BMW Court began its fair notice excessiveness inquiry by
noting that the Due Process Clause requires that a person receive
fair notice both of the conduct that will subject him to punishment
as well as the severity of the penalty that a state may impose.81  The
Court concluded that since “BMW did not receive adequate notice
of the magnitude of the sanction that Alabama might impose for
adhering to the nondisclosure policy,” the $2 million punitive dam-
ages award against it was grossly excessive.82
In arriving at this conclusion, the Court applied the three
guideposts noted earlier to determine whether a punitive damages
award is reasonable or excessive.83  The first guidepost is the degree
of reprehensibility of the defendant’s conduct.84  The Court consid-
ered reprehensibility one of the most important indicia of reason-
ableness because of the longstanding emphasis placed on the “prin-
ciple that punitive damages may not be ‘grossly out of proportion
to the severity of the offense.’”85  The Court held that BMW’s con-
duct was not sufficiently reprehensible to justify the punitive dam-
ages award in the case, pointing out that the non-disclosure policy
inflicted only economic harm and was not indicative of indifference
to, or reckless disregard for, the health and safety of others. 86
Next, the Court considered the second guidepost: the ratio be-
tween the punitive damages award and the actual harm to the
plaintiff.87  The Court termed the comparison between the punitive
damages award and the compensatory award “significant,” point-
ing out that “exemplary damages must bear a ‘reasonable relation-
ship’ to compensatory damages.”88  As in its previous decisions,
however, the Court was adamant in declining to set a rule as to the
permissible ratio beyond which punitive damages awards would
automatically be considered excessive.89  The Court stated: “[w]e
need not, and indeed we cannot, draw a mathematical bright line
between the constitutionally acceptable and the constitutionally
unacceptable that would fit every case.”90  The Court also made
81. Id. at 574.
82. Id. at 574-75.
83. Id. at 575-85; see supra note 56 and accompanying text.
84. BMW, 517 U.S. at 575.
85. Id. at 575-76 (quoting Pacific Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1, 22
(1991)).
86. Id. at 576, 580.  The Court also noted that BMW made no deliberate false
statement nor did it commit an act of affirmative misconduct.  Id. at 579.
87. See id. at 580-83.
88. Id. at 580.
89. Id. at 582-83.
90. Id. (quoting Haslip, 499 U.S. at 18).
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clear its preference for an analysis based on a flexible reasonable-
ness standard rather than a categorical approach, noting that par-
ticularly egregious acts that result in low compensatory damages
awards can still support high punitive damages awards, especially if
the “injury is hard to detect or the monetary value of noneconomic
harm might have been difficult to determine.”91
The Court did, however, consider a mathematical analysis
when it reviewed the punitive-to-compensatory ratios previously
upheld and then compared them to the ratio in the case.92  The
Court stated that, in Haslip, it had called a punitive damages award
that was four times greater than the compensatory award “close to
the line” but had nonetheless upheld it.93  The Court also pointed
out that it upheld a ten to one ratio in TXO which took into ac-
count not only the actual harm, but also the potential harm of the
defendant’s conduct.94  In comparison, the Court observed that the
punitive damages award levied against BMW was thirty-five times
the total actual damages of the fourteen Alabama consumers who
had purchased repainted cars and five-hundred times the actual
damages awarded to the plaintiff.95  The Court then held that this
ratio was unacceptable because it was “dramatically greater” than
those it had previously upheld.96
Finally, the BMW Court applied the third guidepost by com-
paring the punitive damages award with the civil and criminal sanc-
tions that could be imposed for similar misconduct97 and observing
that the maximum civil penalty for violation of the Alabama De-
ceptive Trade Practice Act was only two thousand dollars.98  The
Court reasoned that such relatively low civil penalties for similar
misconduct in other states did not provide fair notice that an of-
fender could be subject to a multimillion dollar penalty.99  This lack
91. Id. at 582-83.  Some academics have proposed that punitive damages
should be based on the difficulty of detection of the harm.  See, e.g.,  A. Mitchell
Polinsky & Steven Shavell, Punitive Damages: An Economic Analysis, 111 HARV.
L. REV. 869, 954 (1998) (arguing that punitive damages should only be awarded if
a tortfeasor has a chance of escaping liability for the harm caused and that the
amount of punitive damages should be the actual damages multiplied by a factor
representing the chance of escaping liability).
92. BMW, 517 U.S. at 581-82.
93. Id. at 581 (quoting Haslip, 499 U.S. at 23-24).
94. Id.
95. Id. at 582 n.35-37.
96. Id. at 582.
97. Id. at 583-85.
98. Id. at 584.
99. Id.
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of fair notice of the severity of the penalty constituted a violation
of the Due Process Clause.100
Based on its analysis of the three fair notice excessiveness
guideposts, the Supreme Court held that the “grossly excessive
award imposed in this case transcend[ed] the constitutional limit”
and reversed the Alabama Supreme Court’s decision to set the pu-
nitive damages award at $2 million.101  The Court also found that
BMW’s conduct did not justify such a large sanction.102  The Court
then remanded the case to the Alabama Supreme Court for their
“independent determination . . . of the award necessary to vindi-
cate the economic interests of Alabama consumers.”103
D. Cooper Industries, Inc. v. Leatherman Tool Group, Inc.
In Cooper Industries, Inc. v. Leatherman Tool Group, Inc.,104
the Supreme Court reaffirmed that the Due Process Clause pro-
100. Id. at 574; see also discussion supra at Part II.C.
101. BMW, 517 U.S. at 585-86.
102. Id. at 585.  Justice Stevens authored the majority opinion in BMW, which
was joined by Justices O’Connor, Kennedy, Souter, and Breyer.  Justice Breyer
also wrote a concurring opinion in which he criticized the Alabama Supreme
Court’s excessiveness inquiry, calling the standards used “vague” and concluding
that the standards imposed “no significant constraints” against arbitrary results
from the punitive damages award.  Id. at 588.  Justice Scalia, joined by Justice
Thomas, dissented, stating that the Fourteenth Amendment does not provide a
federal guarantee that punitive damages awards be reasonable and that federal
invalidation of a state-court punitive damage award is “an unjustified incursion
into the province of state governments.” Id. at 598-99.  Regarding the majority’s
fair notice excessiveness guideposts, Scalia stated:
[T]he ‘guideposts’ mark a road to nowhere . . . . The Court has con-
structed a framework that does not genuinely constrain, that does
not inform state legislatures and lower courts—that does nothing at
all except confer an artificial air of doctrinal analysis upon its essen-
tially ad hoc determination that this particular award of punitive
damages was not ‘fair’.
Id. at 605-06.  Justice Ginsburg, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist, also dissented,
stating that the majority “unnecessarily and unwisely venture[d] into territory tra-
ditionally within the State’s domain.” Id. at 607.  Justice Ginsburg pointed out that
since the Alabama court had reviewed the jury’s award by applying factors previ-
ously approved by the Supreme Court, its decision was “entitled to a presumption
of legitimacy.” Id. at 611.
103. Id. at 586.  On remand the Alabama Supreme Court affirmed the order
denying a new trial on the condition of the plaintiff’s acceptance of a remittitur
reducing the punitive damages award to $50,000. BMW of N. Am., Inc., v. Gore,
701 So. 2d 507, 515 (Ala. 1997).
104. 532 U.S. 424 (2001).
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hibits the imposition of grossly excessive punishments on tortfea-
sors.105  The Court echoed its decision in BMW and instructed lower
courts to evaluate due process challenges to punitive damage
awards by use of the three fair notice excessiveness guideposts.106
Remarkably, the Cooper Court also held that “courts of appeal
should apply a de novo standard of review when passing on district
courts’ determinations of the constitutionality of punitive damages
awards.”107
In Cooper, Leatherman Tool Group sued Cooper Industries in
United States District Court after Cooper created marketing mate-
rials that used modified photographs of a Leatherman pocket tool
for the purpose of advertising its own similar product.108  The jury
found Cooper guilty of trade dress infringement and unfair compe-
tition and awarded Leatherman $50,000 in compensatory dam-
ages.109  The jury also found that Cooper had “acted with a con-
scious indifference to Leatherman’s rights” and awarded $4.5
million in punitive damages.110  The district court considered, but
ultimately denied, any reduction based on a fair notice excessive-
ness inquiry utilizing the BMW excessiveness guideposts.111
On appeal, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals upheld the pu-
nitive damages award.112  The Ninth Circuit reviewed the district
court’s finding that the punitive damages award was “proportional
and fair given the nature of the conduct, the evidence of intentional
passing off, and the size of an award necessary to deter an entity of
Cooper’s size.”113  The Ninth Circuit then held that the district
court’s decision to leave the punitive damages award intact was not
an abuse of discretion.114
105. Id. at 434.  The Cooper Court also shed light on the relationship between
due process excessiveness of punitive damages and the Eighth Amendment. Id. at
433-44.  The Court stated that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment “makes the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition against excessive fines and
cruel and unusual punishments applicable to the States.”  Id.
106. Id. at 440.
107. Id. at 436.
108. Id. at 427-28.  Leatherman alleged trade dress infringement under the fed-
eral Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (2003), and common-law false advertising
and unfair competition.  Id. at 428.
109. Id. at 429.
110. Id.  The jury responded to an interrogatory that asked whether Cooper
had acted with malice.  Id.  After answering in the affirmative, the jury was asked
to determine the amount of the punitive damages award.  Id.
111. Id. at 429.
112. Id. at 430.
113. Id.
114. Id. at 431.
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The Supreme Court granted Cooper’s petition for a writ of
certiorari to resolve a circuit split regarding the standard of review
to be applied when an appellate court reviews a district court’s de-
termination of the constitutionality of a punitive damages award.115
The Supreme Court initially held that de novo review—not abuse
of discretion—is the proper standard.116  The Court reasoned that
while the jury’s assessment of the amount necessary to compensate
a plaintiff for an injury is a factual determination, the jury’s award
of punitive damages does not constitute a finding of “fact” but is
instead an expression of moral condemnation.117  Through this rea-
soning, the Court was able to overcome the Seventh Amendment’s
prohibition of the re-examination of facts found by a jury.118
The Court further justified its holding by stating that consid-
erations of institutional competence when applying the three BMW
guideposts “fail to tip the balance in favor of deferential appellate
review,” therefore favoring the use of an abuse of discretion stan-
dard.119  By providing its own fair notice excessiveness inquiry
based on the BMW guideposts, the Court illustrated that a de novo
review could have led the appellate court to a different conclu-
sion.120  The Court then remanded the case so that the Ninth Circuit
could apply the BMW fair notice excessiveness guideposts under
the more demanding de novo standard.121  Applying the heightened
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. Id. at 432, 437.
118. Id. at 437.  The Court stated: “Because the jury’s award of punitive dam-
ages does not constitute a finding of ‘fact,’ appellate review of the district court’s
determination that an award is consistent with due process does not implicate the
Seventh Amendment concerns raised by respondent and its amicus.”  Id.  The
Seventh Amendment to the United States Constitution provides:
In suits at common law, where the value in controversy shall exceed
twenty dollars, the right of trial by jury shall be preserved, and no fact
tried by a jury, shall be otherwise reexamined in any Court of the United
States, than according to the rules of the common law.
U.S. CONST. amend. VII.
119. Cooper, 532 U.S. at 440.
120. Id. at 441-42.
121. Id. at 443.  Justice Stevens delivered the majority opinion in Cooper, which
was joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices O’Connor, Kennedy, Souter,
Thomas and Breyer.  Justice Thomas filed a concurring opinion in which he stated
that, if given the opportunity, he would vote to overrule BMW because he does
not believe that the Constitution constrains the size of punitive damages awards.
Id.  Similarly, Justice Scalia concurred in the judgment concerning de novo review,
but stated that he “was . . . of the view that excessive punitive damages do not
violate the Due Process Clause.” Id.
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standard, the Ninth Circuit reduced the $4.5 million punitive dam-
ages award to $500,000.122
E. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. v. Campbell
As the Supreme Court expanded its due process fair notice ex-
cessiveness jurisprudence, it established guideposts for courts to
use when determining whether a punitive damages award is consti-
tutionally excessive123 and established that a de novo standard
should be used to review lower courts’ decisions regarding the con-
stitutionality of a given punitive damages award.124  Other ques-
tions—such as whether a state can punish a defendant for unlawful
out-of-state conduct, whether evidence of bad conduct unrelated to
that which harmed the plaintiff can be used to show reprehensibil-
ity, and whether a defendant’s wealth is a proper factor for courts
to use when reviewing the constitutionality of a punitive damages
award—remained largely unanswered until State Farm Mutual
Automobile Insurance Company v. Campbell.125
In State Farm, the defendant insurance company appealed the
decision of the Utah Supreme Court to reinstate a jury’s $145 mil-
lion punitive damages award after the trial judge had reduced the
award to $25 million through a remittitur.126  After applying the
BMW guideposts to the facts of the case, the United States Su-
preme Court held that the punitive damages award was constitu-
tionally excessive and remanded the case so that the Utah Supreme
Court could determine an appropriate lesser amount.127  The Court
stated that the punitive damages award “was neither reasonable
nor proportionate to the wrong committed, and it was an irrational
and arbitrary deprivation of the property of the defendant.”128
In State Farm, after a severe automobile accident, Campbell,
who was insured by State Farm, faced two civil actions, including a
wrongful death suit.  Even though State Farm had evidence that
Campbell caused the accident, it chose not to settle for $25,000—
the amount of Campbell’s policy limits.129  When the case against
Campbell went to trial, the jury found him at fault for the accident
122. Leatherman Tool Group, Inc. v. Cooper Indus., Inc., 285 F.3d 1146, 1152
(9th Cir. 2002).
123. BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 574-86 (1996).
124. Cooper, 532 U.S. at 436.
125. 123 S. Ct. 1513 (2003).
126. Id. at 1519.
127. Id. at 1526.
128. Id.
129. Id. at 1518.
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and awarded the plaintiffs more than $185,000 in damages.130  State
Farm, despite previous assurances to Campbell that he would have
no liability for the accident, made it clear that it did not intend to
pay the amount of the judgment against Campbell in excess of his
policy limit.131
Campbell filed suit against State Farm, alleging bad faith,
fraud, and intentional infliction of emotional distress.132  During the
trial, Campbell introduced evidence that State Farm’s decision to
take the accident case to trial was part of a company-wide scheme
to cap payouts on claims and that State Farm had engaged in nu-
merous fraudulent practices as part of its scheme.133  The jury found
that State Farm had acted in bad faith and, because State Farm’s
conduct was “intentional and sufficiently egregious to warrant pu-
nitive damages,” it granted an award of $2.6 million in compensa-
tory damages and $145 million in punitive damages.134  The trial
court denied State Farm’s motions for a judgment notwithstanding
the verdict and for a new trial, but ordered a remittitur of both
damage awards, which reduced the compensatory damages award
to $1 million and the punitive damages award to $25 million.135
On appeal, the Utah Supreme Court applied a punitive dam-
ages award excessiveness inquiry based on its own jurisprudence as
well as the BMW guideposts.  First, the court noted that pursuant
to Cooper, it was required to review the trial court’s decision on the
punitive damages award de novo.136  The court applied the follow-
ing seven factors that were previously articulated in Crookston v.
Fire Insurance Exchange:137
1) the relative wealth of the defendant; 2) the nature of the al-
leged misconduct; 3) the facts and circumstances surrounding
such misconduct; 4) the effect of the conduct on the lives of the
plaintiff and others; 5) the probability of future recurrence of the
conduct; 6) the relationship of the parties; and 7) the amount of
actual damages awarded.138
The Utah court observed that the trial court had based its remitti-





134. Id. at 1519.
135. Campbell v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 65 P.3d 1134, 1143 (Utah
2001).
136. Id. at 1143-44.
137. 817 P.2d 789 (Utah 1991).
138. Campbell, 65 P.3d at 1146.
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punitive damages to the actual damage award.139  After an exten-
sive analysis of each factor, the Utah court held that the jury’s pu-
nitive damages award was not excessive under any of the factors
and held that the trial court’s remittitur was not required.140
The Utah court then turned to an excessiveness inquiry based
on the BMW guideposts.141  The court recognized that BMW’s rep-
rehensibility guidepost was similar to the factors in Crookston re-
lating to the nature and circumstances of the misconduct.142  Ac-
cordingly, it chose to incorporate its earlier analysis, concluding
that the reprehensibility guidepost did not favor a finding that the
punitive damages award was excessive.143
The Utah court next considered the BMW ratio guidepost,
noting that since there is no categorical rule on the permissible ra-
tio of the compensatory damages award to the punitive damages
award, courts must instead determine the reasonableness of the ra-
tio based on the facts and circumstances of each case.144  The court
concluded that a high ratio was proper in the case because “State
Farm’s fraudulent conduct ha[d] been a consistent way of doing
business for the last twenty years, directed specifically at some of
society’s most vulnerable groups.”145  The Utah court also found
that while the probability of further misconduct by State Farm was
high, the probability of its having to pay damages for that miscon-
duct was low, a finding which further supported a high ratio.146
Finally, the Utah court applied BMW’s third guidepost and
compared the punitive damages award with the civil and criminal
penalties that could be imposed for comparable misconduct.147  The
court rejected State Farm’s argument that only fines actually im-
posed could be used in the comparison, observing that BMW ex-
plicitly stated that a court should look at “penalties that could be
imposed for comparable misconduct.”148  In reaching its decision,
the Utah court tallied the possible penalties that could have been
imposed for the fraudulent misconduct in the case, which included
fines, revocation of State Farm’s state business license, disgorge-
139. Id.




144. Id. (citing BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 580 (1996)).
145. Id. at 1154.
146. Id.
147. Id.
148. Id. (quoting BMW, 517 U.S. at 583) (emphasis added).
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ment of illicit profits, and imprisonment of State Farm’s officers for
up to five years.149
It is worth noting that the Utah court’s decision did not di-
rectly address extraterritoriality—the extent to which the jury con-
sidered evidence of State Farm’s misconduct outside the state of
Utah—when it determined the punitive damages award.  As previ-
ously discussed, in BMW, both the Alabama Supreme Court and
the United States Supreme Court considered this issue crucial.150
The Utah Supreme Court did, however, consider two issues raised
by State Farm that may have related to evidence of out-of-state
conduct: the admissibility of evidence of “other acts” introduced to
show State Farm’s pattern of misconduct and the admissibility of
expert witness testimony introduced to show State Farm’s im-
proper and fraudulent company-wide policies.151  While the Utah
court rejected State Farm’s arguments on these issues, it is surpris-
ing that the court did not consider, as part of its excessiveness in-
quiry, whether the “other acts” evidence and the expert witness
testimony included evidence of State Farm’s misconduct outside of
Utah. 152  This consideration could have been improper for the jury
to undertake when determining the punitive damages award under
BMW.
On appeal, the United States Supreme Court conducted its
own excessiveness review based on BMW’s guideposts and held
that the $145 million punitive damages award must be reduced,
stating that “this case is neither close nor difficult.”153  In analyzing
the case under BMW’s reprehensibility guidepost, the Court held
that a more modest punitive damages award would satisfy Utah’s
interests and that it was inappropriate to use the case “as a plat-
form to expose and punish” State Farm’s nationwide policies.154
The Court then reiterated the proposition from BMW that a State
cannot punish a defendant for lawful out-of-state conduct.155  In ad-
dition, the Court observed that a state does not “have a legitimate
concern in imposing punitive damages to punish a defendant for
unlawful acts committed outside of the [s]tate’s jurisdiction.”156
149. Id.
150. BMW, 517 U.S. at 567, 572-73; see supra notes 67-80 and accompanying
text.
151. Campbell, 65 P.3d at 1155, 1159.
152. Id. at 1155-61.
153. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 123 S. Ct. 1513, 1515 (2003).
154. Id. at 1516.
155. Id. at 1522.
156. Id. (emphasis added).
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The Court next rejected the plaintiff’s argument that the evi-
dence of State Farm’s out-of-state lawful conduct was used solely
to show motive against the plaintiff.157  Punishment based upon
consideration of conduct unrelated to that which harmed the plain-
tiff raises the specter of multiple punishments for the same harm—
something the Court sought to avoid.158  The Court stated that evi-
dence of other bad acts “may be probative when it demonstrates
the deliberateness and culpability of the defendant’s action . . . but
that conduct must have a nexus to the specific harm suffered by the
plaintiff.”159  The Court then found that the jury in State Farm had
“awarded punitive damages to punish and deter conduct that bore
no relation to the [plaintiff’s] harm.”160  The Court continued:
A defendant’s dissimilar acts, independent from the acts upon
which liability was premised, may not serve as the basis for puni-
tive damages.  A defendant should be punished for the conduct
that harmed the plaintiff, not for being an unsavory individual or
business.  Due process does not permit the courts, in the calcula-
tion of punitive damages, to adjudicate the merits of other par-
ties’ hypothetical claims against a defendant under the guise of
the reprehensibility analysis, but we have no doubt the Utah Su-
preme Court did that here.161
As for BMW’s ratio guidepost, the Court again declined to
impose a bright-line ratio rule, cautioning that the punitive dam-
ages award in any case “must be based upon the facts and circum-
stances of the defendant’s conduct and the harm to the plaintiff.”162
However, the Court concluded that few awards “exceeding a sin-
gle-digit ratio between punitive and compensatory damages . . . will
satisfy due process.”163  The Court stated: “Single-digit multipliers
are more likely to comport with due process, while still achieving
the State’s goals of deterrence and retribution, than awards with
ratios in the range of 500 to 1.”164  The Court next observed that
while double-digit ratios may be appropriate where a highly repre-
hensible act results in small economic damages, the converse is also
true: “When compensatory damages are substantial, then a lesser
ratio, perhaps only [1-to-1], can reach the outmost limit of the due
process guarantee.”165
157. Id.
158. Id. at 1523.
159. Id. at 1522.
160. Id. at 1523.
161. Id.
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The Court additionally noted that the plaintiffs in State Farm
had received a substantial ($1 million) compensatory award to
compensate economic injury and emotional distress.166  The Court,
however, viewed the compensatory award in the case as having a
punitive element that was improperly duplicated in the punitive
damages award.167  The Court then rejected the Utah Supreme
Court’s justifications for the large punitive damages award, which
included a low rate of detection and punishment for State Farm’s
bad conduct and enormous wealth.168
Next, the Court analyzed the case under BMW’s comparable
sanctions guidepost, noting that the “most relevant civil sanc-
tion . . . appears to be a $10,000 fine for an act of fraud,  . . . an
amount dwarfed by the $145 million punitive damages award.”169
The Court rejected the Utah court’s speculation regarding the loss
of the business license, disgorgement of profits, and possible im-
prisonment since these possibilities were “drawn from evidence of
out-of-state and dissimilar conduct.”170  After completing its exces-
siveness analysis, the Court held that only “a punitive damages
award at or near the amount of compensatory damages” would be
justified.171
The Exxon Valdez oil spill occurred in 1989—seven years be-
fore the Supreme Court carved out a substantive due process right
against “excessive” punitive damages awards in BMW.  The
evolving due process excessiveness jurisprudence continues to af-
166. Id.
167. Id. at 1525.
168. Id. at 1526.  The Court stated: “The wealth of a defendant cannot justify
an otherwise unconstitutional punitive damages award.” Id. at 1525.
169. Id. at 1526.
170. Id.
171. Id.  Justice Scalia dissented, adhering to his view that “the Due Process
Clause provides no substantive protections against excessive or unreasonable
awards of punitive damages.” Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting).  Justice Thomas also of-
fered a dissent, reiterating his statement from Cooper that “the Constitution does
not constrain the size of punitive damages awards.” Id. (Thomas, J., dissenting)
(quoting Cooper Indus., Inc. v. Leatherman Tool Group, Inc., 532 U.S. 424, 443
(2001) (Thomas J., concurring)).  Justice Ginsburg also dissented, expressing the
view that the Court’s opinion erodes deference to state decisions regarding the
scope of punitive damages they will allow.  Id. at 1527-31 (Ginsburg, J., dissent-
ing).  Justice Ginsburg stated:
I remain of the view that this Court has no warrant to reform state law
governing awards of punitive damages.  Even if I were prepared to ac-
cept the flexible guidelines prescribed in Gore, I would not join the
Court’s swift conversion of those guides into instructions that begin to
resemble marching orders.
Id. at 1531.
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fect the post-spill litigation immensely.  In November of 2001, the
Ninth Circuit applied the BMW guideposts to In re Exxon Valdez
and concluded that the jury’s $5 billion punitive damages award
was excessive under the Due Process Clause.172  The Ninth Circuit
then remanded the case to the district court with an order to re-
duce the award.173  In December 2002, the district court, complying
with the Ninth Circuit’s order, reduced the award by $1 billion.174
Exxon, unsatisfied with the reduction, filed an appeal.  In August
2003, even before the parties submitted appellate briefs, the Ninth
Circuit vacated the district court’s judgment and remanded the case
so that the district court could reconsider its decision in light of
State Farm v. Campbell—the Supreme Court’s most recent due
process excessiveness decision.175  While In re Exxon Valdez com-
menced long before the Supreme Court’s decisions in BMW, Coo-
per, and State Farm, these cases will have a significant impact on
the final outcome of the litigation.  In addition, In re Exxon Valdez
raises several issues regarding due process excessiveness review of
punitive damages awards that remain unresolved even after State
Farm.  These issues will be discussed in Part V.
III.  IN RE EXXON VALDEZ: THE BACKGROUND
A. The Spill and its Aftermath
The events surrounding the Exxon Valdez oil spill provide the
factual context upon which the Ninth Circuit and the district court
reached opposite conclusions regarding the constitutionality of the
punitive damages award.  The Exxon Valdez departed the Alyeska
Pipeline Terminal at 9:12 p.m. on March 23, 1989, loaded with over
fifty-three million gallons of North Slope crude oil bound for a re-
finery in California.176  The vessel was a 987-foot-long single-hulled
172. Exxon II, F.3d 1215, 1241 (9th Cir. 2001).
173. Id.
174. Exxon III, 236 F. Supp. 2d 1043, 1068 (D. Alaska 2002).
175. Exxon IV, No. 03-35166, at 1 (9th Cir. Aug. 18, 2003) (Order).  The Su-
preme Court decided State Farm in April, 2003.
176. Exxon Valdez Oil Spill Trustee Council, Oil Spill Facts: Details About the
Accident, at http://www.oilspill.state.ak.us/facts/details.html (last visited Oct. 1,
2003); see also John Keeble, The Imaginary Journey of Captain Joseph Hazel-
wood, in THE EXXON VALDEZ DISASTER: READINGS ON A MODERN SOCIAL
PROBLEM 23-33 (J. Steven Picou, et al., eds., 1997) (describing in detail the events
immediately preceding and following the grounding of the Exxon Valdez and de-
scribing contributing factors such as crew fatigue and understaffing).
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tanker and was the second-newest tanker in Exxon’s fleet.177  The
ship contained nineteen crew members and the captain, Joseph
Hazelwood.178  During the hours before the ship’s departure, Ha-
zelwood consumed at least fifteen ounces of alcohol.179  In fact, Ha-
zelwood was an alcoholic who had undergone treatment but had
resumed drinking while in command of Exxon’s ships—facts that
were known to Exxon long before the spill.180
After the ship exited the natural harbor, Hazelwood took con-
trol from a harbor pilot and began the regular procedures to ma-
neuver the ship out of the normal shipping lanes in order to avoid
heavy ice calved from nearby glaciers.181  Hazelwood instructed the
first mate to return the vessel to the normal shipping lanes and left
the bridge.182  However, the first mate failed to properly turn the
vessel and the ship “fetched up . . . hard aground . . . off Bligh
Reef” at 12:04 a.m.183  Hazelwood reported the grounding to the
United States Coast Guard and attempted to move the vessel off
the reef.184  If he had been successful, the vessel might have cap-
sized, risking the lives of the crew, and increasing the magnitude of
the spill.185
The vessel was badly damaged and the grounding caused an
oil spill of massive proportions.186  Within the first few hours, over
ten million gallons of oil spilled.187  Furthermore, the oil spill re-
sponse plans proved woefully inadequate, and three days of calm
weather passed without much oil being skimmed from the sur-
face.188  A response barge maintained by Alyeska Pipeline Service
Company was out of service and unavailable for use, and there
177. Exxon Valdez Oil Spill Trustee Council, supra note 176; see also National
Response Team, The Exxon Valdez Oil Spill: A Report to the President, May 1989
in THE EXXON VALDEZ DISASTER: READINGS ON A MODERN SOCIAL PROBLEM
39-50 (J. Steven Picou, et al., eds., 1997) (describing the design of the Exxon Val-
dez and the spill response plans that existed prior to the Exxon Valdez oil spill).
178. Exxon Valdez Oil Spill Trustee Council, supra note 176.
179. Exxon II, 270 F.3d 1215, 1223 (9th Cir. 2001).
180. Id.
181. Exxon III, 236 F. Supp. 2d 1043, 1045-46 (D. Alaska 2002).
182. Id. at 1046.
183. Exxon Valdez Oil Spill Trustee Council, supra note 176.
184. Exxon III, 236 F. Supp. 2d at 1046.
185. Id. at 1046-47.
186. Brian O’Donoghue, Diver’s First Glimpse: Supertanker Impaled On Rocks
of Bligh Reef, FAIRBANKS DAILY NEWS-MINER, Mar. 24, 1999, at A8 (“There was
a huge geyser of oil bubbling up two or three feet above the surface of the wa-
ter.”)
187. National Response Team, supra note 177, at 39.
188. Exxon Valdez Oil Spill Trustee Council, supra note 2.
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were insufficient skimmers, booms, and dispersants to make a dif-
ference in so large a spill.189  The one bright spot in the response ef-
fort was the lightering operation—removing the remaining oil to
another ship—that was undertaken in spite of enormous risk to the
crew involved, but that ultimately kept forty-two million gallons of
oil from spilling.190 A storm hit on March 26, 1989, and strong
winds, coupled with ocean currents and tidal action, spread the oil,
washing it onto beaches as far as six-hundred miles from Bligh
Reef.191  The oil, in varying concentrations, eventually covered thir-
teen-thousand miles of the Alaskan coastline.192
Commercial and subsistence fishing, recreational tourism, and
shore-based businesses were immediately disrupted as a result of
the spill.193  Coastal communities, fishermen, boat owners, and
other property owners suffered extensive economic damages.194
Individuals and communities also suffered grave non-economic
damages.195
The spill is no longer one of the top fifty largest spills world-
wide, but is considered to have had the greatest negative effect on
the environment.196  As a result of the spill, the natural resources in
the area were devastated.197  However, the question of the extent of
environmental damage and recovery remains a matter of dispute.198
189. Id.
190. See Exxon III, 236 F. Supp. 2d at 1047; Brian O’Donoghue, Battle Waged
to Unload 991,000 Barrels of Crude, FAIRBANKS DAILY NEWS-MINER, Mar. 25,
1999, at A1.
191. O’Harrra, supra note 2, at M5.
192. Exxon Valdez Oil Spill Trustee Council, supra note 2.
193. Exxon III, 236 F. Supp. 2d at 1047.
194. Id.
195. See generally THE EXXON VALDEZ DISASTER: READINGS ON A MODERN
SOCIAL PROBLEM (J. Steven Picou, et al., eds., 1997) (collection of articles focus-
ing on the spill as a systemic “technological disaster” and describing the ecologi-
cal, economic, social, cultural, and psychological impacts); SHARON K. ARAJI, THE
EXXON VALDEZ OIL SPILL: SOCIAL, ECONOMIC, AND PSYCHOLOGICAL IMPACTS
ON HOMER (1992); see also Exxon Valdez Oil Spill Trustee Council, Home Page,
at http://www.oil.spill.state.ak.us (last visited Oct. 22, 2003) (providing a compre-
hensive collection of information related to all aspects of the spill, as well as a
large topical bibliography of scholarly articles and links to other sources of infor-
mation).
196. Exxon Valdez Oil Spill Trustee Council, supra note 3 (“The timing of the
spill, the remote and spectacular location, the thousands of miles of rugged and
wild shoreline, and the abundance of wildlife in the region combined to make it an
environmental disaster well beyond the scope of other spills.”).
197. Nancy Lord, Oil in the Sea: Initial Biological Impacts of the Exxon Valdez
Oil Spill, in THE EXXON VALDEZ DISASTER: READINGS ON A MODERN SOCIAL
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Exxon soon began a cleanup operation that took place over
the next three summers and that employed over ten thousand
workers, one thousand boats, and one hundred aircraft.199  The op-
eration cost Exxon $2.1 billion.200  However, only a small percent-
age of the spilled oil—about 14%—was actually recovered.201
Exxon also began a settlement program with the individuals and
entities who had suffered economic damages as a result of the spill,
and eventually paid out more than $300 million to over ten-
thousand claimants.202
B. Exxon’s Settlement with the Government Trustees
Shortly after the spill, the federal government and the State of
Alaska filed suit against Exxon to recover for environmental dam-
age caused by the spill.  The parties ultimately settled the suit, and
Exxon agreed to pay a significant amount in fines and restitution,
plus an amount for the settlement itself.  The Ninth Circuit, when it
concluded that the punitive damages award in In re Exxon Valdez
was excessive, pointed to this settlement agreement as a factor that
should mitigate the size of the punitive damages awarded.203  This
section summarizes the settlement agreement and its effect on sub-
sequent private litigation.
The United States and the State of Alaska, acting as trustees
for the public, filed suit against Exxon pursuant to provisions of the
Clean Water Act204 and the Comprehensive Environmental Re-
PROBLEM 104 (J. Steven Picou, et al., eds., 1997) (stating that over 260,000 birds,
and 3,500 sea otters died as a result of the spill).
198. Doug O’Harra, Exxon Valdez: Legacy of a Spill: Sound Battles Back, But
Threats Linger, ANCHORAGE DAILY NEWS, Mar. 21, 1999, at M1 (stating: “Over
the years since the March 24, 1989, spill, Prince William Sound has become a
demonstration of the resilience of nature and the persistence of North Slope
crude.”).  There are also several ten-year retrospective newspaper accounts cov-
ering the ecological and other impacts of the spill.  See also Glen Martin, Valdez
Spill Leaves Bitter Residue; Oil is gone after 10 years, but ecological, economic fall-
out continues, S.F. CHRON., Mar. 24, 1999, at A1; Ross Anderson, The Spill Is
Gone—10 Years Later, Debate Still Rages over Effects of the Exxon Valdez Disas-
ter In Alaska, SEATTLE TIMES, Mar. 21, 1999, at A14.
199. Martin, supra note 198, at A1.
200. Id.
201. Id.
202. Exxon II, 270 F.3d 1215, 1223 (9th Cir. 2001); Jenkins & Kastner, supra
note 5, at 155.
203. Exxon II, 270 F.3d at 1244.
204. Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1386 (2000).
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sponse, Compensation, and Liability Act205 in order to “recover
damages for restoration of the environment as well as for losses
sustained by the public regarding the use of natural resources.”206
The United States also criminally prosecuted Exxon for violating
several environmental statutes, including provisions of the Clean
Water Act, the Refuse Act, the Migratory Bird Treaty Act, the
Ports and Waterways Safety Act, and the Dangerous Cargo Act.207
As part of the subsequent settlement agreement, Exxon pled
guilty to four misdemeanor counts, was fined $25 million, and was
ordered to pay $100 million in criminal restitution.208  Exxon also
agreed to pay $900 million into a trust fund administered by agen-
cies of the United States and the State of Alaska.209 The district
court approved the parties’ consent decree in October 1991, stating
that the recovery was “compensatory and remedial” and that
“[n]othing in this agreement . . . is intended to affect legally the
claims, if any, of any person or entity not a Party to this Agree-
ment.”210
Since the government trustees had acted on behalf of the pub-
lic to recover the damages to the environment, no future plaintiff
could thereafter recover damages for environmental harms.  In
Alaska Sport Fishing Association v. Exxon Corporation,211 a group
representing sport fishing enthusiasts filed a class action suit argu-
205. Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability
Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675 (2000) (hereinafter “CERCLA”).
206. Jenkins & Kastner, supra note 5, at 181.
207. Exxon III, 236 F. Supp. 2d 1043, 1048 (D. Alaska 2002).
208. Id.
209. Id. at 1047; see also United States v. Exxon Corp., No. A91-082 at 3 (D.
Alaska 1991) (consent decree); State of Alaska v. Exxon Corp., No. A91-083 Civil,
at 3 (D. Alaska 1991) (consent decree).  The Exxon Valdez Oil Spill Trustee
Council, consisting of three state and three federal agency representatives was
formed to use the settlement funds to restore the injured ecosystem.  See Exxon
Valdez Oil Spill Trustee Council, Oil Spill Facts: Settlement, at http://www.
oilspill.state.ak.us/gem/facts/settlement.html (last visited Mar. 11, 2003); see also
Diane S. Calendine, Investigating The Exxon Valdez Restoration Effort: Is
Resource Acquisition Really Restoration?, 9 DICK. J. ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 341, 343
(2000) (criticizing the use of the settlement trust funds to purchase equivalent
lands instead of attempting to return the damaged lands to pre-spill conditions);
Kevin R. Murray, et. al., Natural Resource Damage Trustees: Whose Side Are They
Really On?, 5 ENVTL. LAW. 407, 407 (1999) (describing the federal statutes which
appoint governmental entities to act as trustees to oversee the process of repairing
damaged natural resources and offering pointed criticism of those systems).
210. United States v. Exxon Corp., No. A91-082, at 3, 26 (D. Alaska Oct. 9,
1991) (consent decree).
211. 34 F.3d 769 (9th Cir. 1994).
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ing that they suffered an injury distinct from that suffered by the
general public—lost recreational use of public natural resources
due to the oil spill.212  The Ninth Circuit found that the two gov-
ernments in the previous settlement agreement had acted as public
trustees with authority to recover lost-use damages.213  Therefore,
the court concluded that privity of interest existed between the
trustees and the sport fishers and that sufficient identity of the is-
sues existed to bar the sport fishers’ suit under the doctrine of res
judicata.214  Subsequently, the Ninth Circuit distinguished the In re
Exxon Valdez plaintiffs, who sought to recover economic damages
due to commercial fishing losses, from the Alaska Sport Fishing
plaintiffs.215
IV.  IN RE EXXON VALDEZ: THE CASE
This section summarizes the In re Exxon Valdez litigation as it
pertains to the due process excessiveness challenge raised by
Exxon and is divided into several sub-sections: Section A discusses
the case before the district court; Section B discusses the arguments
made by Exxon regarding its due process excessiveness challenge;
Section C discusses the plaintiffs’ response to those arguments;
Section D summarizes the Ninth Circuit’s decision to vacate the
punitive damages award and remand; Section E summarizes the
parties’ arguments to the district court upon remand; and Section F
summarizes the district court’s conclusion that the punitive dam-
ages award was not constitutionally excessive.
A. The Case Before the District Court
The thirty thousand claims brought by private parties seeking
to recover economic damages slowly filtered through the judicial
funnel of the Alaska state court system and then, after removal,
through the federal district court system.216  Through various mo-
212. Id. at 770-71; see also Scott Kerin, Alaska Sport Fishing Association v.
Exxon Corporation Highlights the Need to Take a Hard Look at the Doctrine of
Parens Patriae When Applied to Natural Resource Damage Litigation, 25 ENVTL.
L. 897, 923 (1995) (describing the suit brought by sport fishing enthusiasts and of-
fering a critical analysis of the Ninth Circuit’s “blind allegiance to the sufficiency
of government parens patriae action” to the detriment of private litigants).
213. Alaska Sport Fishing Ass’n, 34 F.3d at 772.
214. Id. at 774.
215. Exxon II, 270 F.3d 1215, 1227-28 (9th Cir. 2001); see also infra notes 325-
329 and accompanying text.
216. Jenkins & Kastner, supra note 5, at 166-78 (providing a detailed summary
of the complicated litigation following the spill); see also David Lebedoff,
CLEANING UP: THE STORY BEHIND THE BIGGEST LEGAL BONANZA OF OUR TIME
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tions filed by Exxon, the plaintiffs were gradually whittled down.217
Most of the remaining claims were consolidated into one class ac-
tion—In re Exxon Valdez—with three certified classes for compen-
satory damages: (1) a commercial fishing class; (2) a Native class;
and (3) a landowner class.218 Exxon did not dispute its liability for
compensatory damages, stipulating that its negligence had caused
the oil spill.219  Only the amount of the compensatory damages and
Exxon’s liability for punitive damages were disputed.220  In addi-
tion, the district court certified a mandatory punitive damages
class, “so the award would not be duplicated in other litigation and
would include all punitive damages the jury thought appropri-
ate.”221
The trial began on May 2, 1994, and was divided into three
phases.222  In the first phase, the jury found that Exxon had been
reckless, which made it liable for punitive damages.223  In the sec-
ond phase, the jury found that Exxon was liable to the commercial
fishermen for $287 million in compensatory economic damages.224
In the third phase, the jury was charged with deciding the appro-
priate amount of a punitive damages award, if any, against
Exxon.225  Regarding the jury verdict on punitive damages, the dis-
trict court stated, “In consultation with counsel, unusually detailed
punitive damages instructions were developed for the purposes of
this case.”226  The jury returned a punitive damages award of $5 bil-
lion.227  Exxon filed a motion for reduction or remittitur of the
award, but it was denied by the district court, which entered a final
judgment in favor of the plaintiffs on September 24, 1996.228  Exxon
1 (1997) (providing an interesting literary account of the people involved in the oil
spill and subsequent civil litigation).
217. Jenkins & Kastner, supra note 5, at 168.
218. Exxon II, 270 F.3d at 1225; Exxon III, 236 F. Supp. 2d 1043, 1048 (D.
Alaska 2002).
219. Exxon III, 236 F. Supp. 2d at 1048.
220. Id.
221. Exxon II, 270 F.3d at 1225.
222. Exxon III, 236 F. Supp. 2d at 1048.
223. Id.
224. Id.
225. Exxon II, 270 F.3d at 1225.  A fourth phase, to determine the compensa-
tory damages of the plaintiffs other than the commercial fishermen was planned,
but these claims settled before trial.  Id.
226. Exxon III, 236 F. Supp. 2d at 1049.
227. Id. at 1068.
228. Id. at 1050 n.24.
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subsequently appealed and obtained a stay of execution by posting
a supersedeas bond in the amount of $6.75 billion.229
B. Exxon’s Due Process Challenge to the Punitive Damages
Award
On appeal, Exxon raised several issues, including a due proc-
ess challenge to the $5 billion punitive damages award.230  Specifi-
cally, Exxon argued that when analyzed under the BMW guide-
posts, the jury’s award exceeded the constitutional limit of the Due
Process Clause and “must be drastically reduced.”231  Considering
the degree of reprehensibility guidepost first, Exxon argued that it
229. Id. at 1050.  A supersedeas bond is required when a party petitions to set
aside a judgment or to stay execution during an appeal from which the other party
may be made whole if the action is unsuccessful. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1438
(6th ed. 1990); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 62(d).
230. Joint Opening Brief of Appellants Exxon Corp. and Exxon Shipping Co.
at 71-76, Exxon II, 270 F.3d 1215 (9th Cir. 2001) (No. 97-351191).  In its Opening
Brief—which was over one-hundred pages long—Exxon raised the following addi-
tional nine main arguments: (1) Exxon argued that any award of punitive damages
was impermissible under the Due Process Clause because sufficient punishment
and deterrence had already been obtained through the $900-million settlement
with government trustees, the $304 million in compensation to private parties, the
$125 million in criminal penalties, and the $2.1 million clean-up expenditure, id. at
27; (2) Exxon argued that under federal maritime law punitive damages are not
available when other liabilities and costs provide effective deterrence and pun-
ishment, id. at 32; (3) Exxon argued that the $900 million settlement with the State
of Alaska—which acted in a parens patriae capacity—included all public punitive
damages claims and therefore barred future plaintiffs from seeking punitive dam-
ages under the principle of res judicata, id. at 34-40; (4) Exxon argued that avail-
ability of the common law punitive damages remedy was preempted by the Clean
Water Act’s remedial scheme in which Congress had explicitly provided remedies
to punish and deter oil spills but had deliberately chosen not to provide punitive
damages even for “willful misconduct,” id. 40-41; (5) Exxon argued that the dis-
trict court erred when it instructed the jury that the burden of proof to be used to
determine whether punitive damages were warranted was the preponderance of
the evidence standard and not the heightened clear and convincing evidence stan-
dard, id. at 43-47; (6) Exxon argued that under federal maritime law it should not
have been held vicariously liable for Hazelwood’s recklessness, because Hazel-
wood violated its explicit policies and instructions, id. at 48-52; (7) Exxon argued
that the jury’s punitive damages award could not be supported due to insufficient
evidence that Hazelwood recklessly caused the grounding or that Exxon recklessly
disregarded the risk of an accident, id. at 56-62; (8) Exxon argued that the jury
improperly considered evidence from outside the record, id. at 85; and (9) Exxon
argued that the jury incorrectly calculated the compensatory damages award, id. at
88.
231. Id. at 71.
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had been improperly punished for Hazelwood’s unauthorized acts,
which were contrary to company policies.232  Exxon contended that
any negligence on its part in hiring and supervising Hazelwood fell
short of the recklessness needed to justify a large punitive damages
award.233  Exxon also argued that the award was unwarranted be-
cause its conduct was unintentional, unlike the examples of repre-
hensible conduct identified by the Supreme Court, such as vio-
lence, deceit, or intentional malice.234  Exxon stated, “[n]either the
grounding of the Exxon Valdez nor the oil spill resulted in plain-
tiffs’ death or personal injury, or put their ‘health and safety’ at
risk.”235
Exxon also contended that the reprehensibility of its conduct
was fully mitigated by its extensive post-spill “efforts to clean up
the oil and mitigate any harm from it, at a cost of over $2 billion”236
Exxon also took issue with the plaintiffs’ argument that the oil spill
was reprehensible because it caused great environmental harm.237
Exxon pointed out that the district court had instructed the jury not
to consider damage to natural resources or to the environment
generally.238  To that end, Exxon emphasized the following portion
of the district court’s jury instruction: “Any liability for punitive
damages relating to these harms has been fully resolved in pro-
ceedings involving the Exxon defendants and the Natural Resource
Trustees. . . .”239
Next, Exxon turned to BMW’s second guidepost—the ratio of
the punitive damages award to the actual harm to the plaintiff.
Exxon noted that the district court had calculated the total harm to
the plaintiffs as somewhere between $288 and $418 million, which
resulted in a punitive to compensatory ratio of somewhere between
twelve to one and seventeen to one.240  Exxon stated, “If 4-to-1 was
232. Id. at 72.
233. Id.
234. Id. at 71-72 (quoting BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 599
(1996)).
235. Id. at 73 (quoting BMW, 517 U.S. at 599).
236. Id.
237. Joint Reply Brief and Joint Answering Brief of Exxon Corp. and Exxon
Shipping Co. at 44, Exxon II, 270 F.3d 1215 (9th Cir. 2001) (No. 97-351191).  Like
its Opening Brief, Exxon’s Reply Brief was over one-hundred pages long.
238. Id.
239. Id.
240. Joint Opening Brief of Appellants Exxon Corp. and Exxon Shipping Co.
at 74-75, Exxon II, 270 F.3d 1215 (9th Cir. 2001) (No. 97-351191).  Exxon also con-
tended that the district court had improperly included the voluntary payments
Exxon had made to some plaintiffs in its total and that the true amount of the
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‘close to the line’ in Haslip—a case of intentional fraud which was
purposely concealed—then in this case, with easy-to-detect harm,
substantial compensatory damages, and an unparalleled record of
remedial and corrective measures costing more than $3 billion, a 4-
to-1 ratio would be far over the line.”241
Regarding BMW’s third guidepost—comparison of the sanc-
tions imposed for similar conduct—Exxon argued that the punitive
damages award was excessive since it had already paid the criminal
sanction imposed against it by the district court.  Exxon argued that
federal and state officials, acting pursuant to the Clean Water Act,
had found that a fine of $25 million (remitted from $150 million)
and restitution of $100 million “was sufficient to accomplish pun-
ishment and deterrence in light of Exxon’s $3.5-billion expendi-
tures for clean up, natural resource damages, and claims pay-
ments.”242  Exxon noted that the punitive damages award was
twenty times the amount of the criminal fine and argued that since
BMW advised reviewing courts to give “substantial deference” to
comparable sanctions, the punitive damages award against it “must
be set aside or drastically reduced.” 243
Exxon contended that the plaintiff’s analysis of the compara-
ble sanction guidepost was flawed.244  Specifically, Exxon argued
harm was only $222 million, a figure which would result in a twenty-three to one
ratio.  Id. at 75.
241. Id. at 76.  Exxon also criticized the plaintiff’s analysis of BMW’s ratio
guidepost, arguing that the high-ratio cases the plaintiffs cited involved a combina-
tion of intentional torts, low compensatory damages, and low detection rates,
which necessitate larger punitive damages to provide deterrence. Joint Reply
Brief and Joint Answering Brief of Exxon Corp. and Exxon Shipping Co. at 45,
Exxon II (No. 97-351191).  Exxon stated that: “None of the plaintiff’s cases in-
volved a non-intentional tort for which (1) criminal punishment had previously
been assessed; (2) compensatory damages were in the multimillions; and (3) the
tortfeasor’s accident-related losses and expenses were in the multibillions.”  Id. at
46.  Exxon also provided a lengthy critique of the manner in which the plaintiffs
calculated the amount of their harm.  Id. at 46-50.  Exxon contended that the
plaintiffs should not have included the following items in their calculation of harm:
(1) the $98 million settlement payment from Alyeska; (2) the $123 million Exxon
voluntarily paid to fish processors; (3) the $339 million that the plaintiffs claimed
in the impact stipulation; (4) the amount of potential harm that could have re-
sulted if more oil had spilled; and (5) the claims made by the plaintiffs which were
not legally cognizable. Id.
242. Joint Opening Brief Of Appellants Exxon Corp. and Exxon Shipping Co.
at 76, Exxon II (No. 97-351191).
243. Id. at 77.
244. Joint Reply Brief and Joint Answering Brief of Exxon Corp. and Exxon
Shipping Co. at 50, Exxon II (No. 97-351191).
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that the plaintiffs’ estimate of the potential criminal penalty of $8
billion had a “fairy-tale quality . . . in a world where the $125 mil-
lion in fines and restitution actually imposed exceeded the total of
all previous environmental fines . . . .”245  Exxon argued that under
BMW, the consideration “is not the hypothetical fine that could
have been imposed, but the fine that actually was imposed.”246  Fur-
thermore, Exxon contended it did not have fair notice of such a
huge penalty—the basis for BMW.247
In addition to providing an analysis of the BMW guideposts,
Exxon also took issue with what it characterized as the “[p]laintiff’s
wealth argument.”248  Exxon argued that just because it can afford
to pay the punitive damages award, it does not make it reason-
able.249  Exxon stated that the BMW court sent a clear message that
the wealth of the defendant is not a valid basis for affirming a large
punitive damages award.250  Exxon contended that the costs of the
oil spill had already sufficiently deterred the company and stated
that, “[t]here is simply no rational basis to conclude on the basis of
Exxon’s size or wealth that piling on an additional $5 billion was or
is necessary to induce Exxon to change its behavior.”251
C. The Plaintiffs’ Arguments Regarding Exxon’s Due Process
Challenge to the Punitive Damages Award
The Plaintiffs’ Brief included a lengthy discussion of the due
process challenge to the punitive damages award.252  The plaintiffs
245. Id. at 51 (emphasis in the original).
246. Id. (emphasis in the original).
247. Id. at 51-52.
248. Id. at 52.
249. Id.
250. Id. at 52-53.
251. Id. at 56.
252. Brief of the Plaintiffs at 116-49, Exxon II, 270 F.3d 1215 (9th Cir. 2001)
(Nos. 97-351191, 97-35193).  In its 247-page brief, the plaintiffs made the following
arguments: (1) that the district court gave Exxon extraordinary procedural and
substantive protections, id. at 59-65; (2) that Exxon cannot claim immunity from
punitive damages as a matter of law due to the costs, sanctions, and settlements
arising from the spill, id. at 65-84; (3) that the Clean Water Act does not preempt
punitive damages awards, id. at 78-84; (4) that the district court correctly in-
structed the jury that the burden of proof required to prove Exxon’s recklessness
was the preponderance of the evidence standard, id. at 85-87; (5) that Exxon could
be held responsible for the reckless actions of a managerial agent, id. at 95-106; (6)
that the evidence was sufficient to support the jury’s findings that the spill was
caused by recklessness, id. at 106-16; (7) that the $5-billion punitive damages
award was proper, id. at 116-49; (8) that the district court properly rejected
Exxon’s allegation that the jury had considered outside material, id. at 150-53; and
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began by discussing the standard of review that should be applied
when a court examines the due process fair notice excessiveness
inquiry of a lower court.253  Since the Plaintiff’s Opening Brief pre-
dated Cooper’s holding that a de novo standard must be applied,
the plaintiffs stated that only the abuse-of-discretion standard
should be used.254  Similarly, the plaintiffs argued that the district
court itself was obliged to give “substantial deference” to the jury’s
discretion to award punitive damages.255  Pointing out that the dis-
trict court had “conducted a thorough review of the jury’s determi-
nation [based on] the relevant factors,” the plaintiffs argued that
the district court had not abused its discretion when it concluded
that a reasonable jury could have determined that the punitive
damages award was required to punish and deter Exxon and that
the award was not contrary to the great weight of the evidence.256
Based on these contentions, the plaintiffs argued that “review
of the punitive damage factors that have been identified by the Su-
preme Court and this Court” would show that “the district court
was well within its discretion.”257  The plaintiffs offered the follow-
ing factors to the Ninth Circuit for its review: (1) the reprehensibil-
ity of Exxon’s conduct; (2) the vulnerability of the plaintiffs; (3) the
actual and potential harm caused by Exxon’s conduct; (4) a com-
parison of the potential criminal and civil penalties; (5) Exxon’s fi-
nancial condition; and (6) Exxon’s lack of contrition.258
The plaintiffs sought to provide the evidentiary basis upon
which the jury could have found that Exxon’s conduct was repre-
hensible.  First, the plaintiffs pointed to Exxon’s stipulation that it
knew that an oil spill in Prince William Sound would have a signifi-
(9) that the jury’s calculation of the compensatory damages award was based on
substantial evidence and should not be disturbed, id. at 154-60.
253. Id. at 116.
254. Id. at 116-19.
255. Id. at 119.  To support its contentions, the plaintiffs quoted the following
portion of the Supreme Court’s decision in Browning-Ferris v. Kelco Disposal,
Inc.:
In reviewing an award of punitive damages, the role of the district
court is to determine whether the jury’s verdict is within the con-
fines set by law, and to determine . . . whether a new trial or remitti-
tur should be ordered.  The Court of Appeals should then review
the district court’s determination under an abuse-of-discretion
standard.
Id. at 117 (quoting Browning-Ferris v. Kelco Disposal, Inc., 492 U.S. 257, 279
(1989)).
256. Id. at 119 (citation omitted).
257. Id. at 120.
258. Id. at 121-42.
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cant impact on the environment.259  Second, the plaintiffs con-
tended that Exxon knew that assigning an alcoholic master to a
tanker would increase the likelihood of such a spill.260  Third, the
plaintiffs contended that Exxon knew that Hazelwood was an alco-
holic who was likely to suffer a relapse.261  Under BMW’s reprehen-
sibility guidepost, the plaintiffs concluded that Exxon’s knowing
disregard of these risks was an “‘aggravating factor’ indicative of
‘particularly reprehensible conduct.’”262
The plaintiffs then contended that the vulnerability of those
harmed was also an aggravating factor in assessing the degree of
reprehensibility of the defendant’s conduct.263  Specifically, the
plaintiffs pointed to BMW for the proposition that “infliction of
economic injury . . . when the target is financially vulnerable, can
warrant a substantial penalty.”264  The plaintiffs contended that
since commercial and subsistence fishing are inherently difficult
and risky endeavors dependent on natural resources, the plaintiffs
were particularly vulnerable to the risk of a major oil spill, but, un-
like Exxon, they had virtually no ability to avoid that risk.265
Next, the plaintiffs made an argument based on BMW’s sec-
ond guidepost—the ratio between the punitive damages award and
the harm caused by the defendant’s conduct.266  Unlike Exxon, the
plaintiffs characterized the ratio as between the punitive damages
award and “the ‘harm,’ not the net compensatory damage judg-
ment.”267  The plaintiffs argued the relevant estimate of harm to be
used in the ratio was the amount stipulated by the parties in Phase
III of the trial in the Impact Stipulation, and not, as Exxon argued,
the Phase II net compensatory damage judgment.268  Under the
stipulation, the plaintiffs’ $768 million harm amount results in a ra-
tio of 6.5-to-1.269  Using Exxon’s $432 million harm amount results
259. Id. at 121 (citing the trial transcript).
260. Id.
261. Id. at 122.  Plaintiffs also argued that Exxon knew of the risk of crew fa-
tigue that resulted from operating its tankers with a reduced number of crew
members and of the risks of transporting oil through the sound at night and when
ice was present. Id. at 122-23 (citing the trial transcript).
262. Id. at 123 (quoting BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 599
(1996)).
263. Id. at 125.
264. Id. at 124 (quoting BMW, 517 U.S. at 599).
265. Id. at 125-26.
266. Id. at 126-34.
267. Id. at 127 (internal citations omitted).
268. Id.
269. Id. at 128-29.
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in a ratio of 11.6-to-1.270  The plaintiffs pointed out that: “[e]ither
ratio is well within the range of ratios upheld in recent punitive
damages cases.”271
In addition, the plaintiffs contended that under BMW, “a
higher ratio . . . may be justified when the potential harm is greater
than the harm that actually occurred or when it is difficult to estab-
lish the existence or value of the harm, so that the compensatory
damages awarded do not reflect the total harm.”272  Using a “poten-
tial harm” argument to justify the large punitive damages to harm
ratio, the plaintiffs argued that if the tanker, the Exxon Valdez, had
spilled more than eleven million of the fifty million gallons of oil it
carried “the harm would have been many times greater.”273  The
plaintiffs also argued that a higher ratio is justified because the
economic harm of an “oil spill is difficult to quantify and prove”
and because much of the harm caused by the spill remained un-
compensated.274
Turning to BMW’s third guidepost—the comparison between
the punitive damages award and the sanctions imposed for similar
conduct—the plaintiffs contended that the relevant inquiry under
BMW is whether there is “‘fair notice’ to the tortfeasor of the po-
tential for punishment of the order of magnitude assessed.”275  Un-
like Exxon, the plaintiffs characterized this guidepost as a compari-
son of the punitive damages award with “civil or criminal penalties
that could be imposed” for comparable misconduct.276  The plain-
tiffs pointed out that if Exxon had been convicted of violating the
five federal statutes under which it had been indicted, the district
court could have imposed a criminal penalty of “twice the gross
loss” pursuant to the Federal Sentencing Guidelines.277  The plain-
270. Id.
271. Id. at 129.  The plaintiffs provide a long string cite of cases to support their
argument.  Id. at 129 n.62.
272. Id. at 131 (citing BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 582 (1996)).
In actuality, the BMW Court stated that: “A higher ratio may . . . be justified in
cases in which the injury is hard to detect or the monetary value of noneconomic
harm might have been difficult to determine.” BMW, 517 U.S. at 582.
273. Brief of the Plaintiffs at 147, Exxon II (Nos. 97-351191, 97-35193) (internal
quotation omitted).
274. Id. at 131.  Regarding uncompensated harm the plaintiffs stated that:
“Over 40,000 individuals and businesses who suffered hundreds of millions of
dollars of economic harm were barred by the [district court’s maritime law] dis-
missals.”  Id.  The plaintiffs also claimed that “vast emotional and psychological
harm” has gone uncompensated.  Id. at 132-33.
275. Id. at 134.
276. Id. (emphasis added by plaintiffs) (quoting BMW, 517 U.S. at 584).
277. Id. (citing 18 U.S.C. § 3571(d) (2001)).
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tiffs then argued that the gross loss amount included the $900 mil-
lion trustee settlement, the $2.1 billion in cleanup costs, and all the
harm to the private plaintiffs—estimated at $432 million to $950
million—for a total loss of up to $4 billion, which would permit a
criminal penalty of up to $8 billion.278  Therefore, the plaintiffs ar-
gued, “Exxon certainly had notice that the applicable punishment
could exceed $5 billion.”279
In addition to the BMW guideposts, the plaintiffs offered two
other factors that they contended have been used by courts when
“determining the amount of punitive damages necessary to punish
and deter.”280  First, the plaintiffs argued that the financial condi-
tion of the defendant must be reflected in the punitive damages
award or else a wealthy defendant could be “impervious to the
sting of a punitive damage award.”281  The plaintiffs then demon-
strated that “Exxon’s imperviousness to any punitive damage
award” by listing evidence offered at the trial to establish Exxon’s
wealth, including Exxon’s average annual revenue for the years
1989-1993 ($116.6 billion), Exxon’s market capitalization in 1993
($78.4 billion), and Exxon’s average net income for the years 1989-
1993 ($4.8 billion).282  Second, the plaintiffs argued that the degree
of remorse or contrition exhibited by a defendant is also a factor
used to determine the punishment.283  On this point, the plaintiffs
discussed Exxon’s post-spill conduct, attempting to show Exxon’s
alleged lack of contrition.284
Finally, the plaintiffs argued that prior payments made by
Exxon as a result of the spill should not be viewed as a significant
mitigating factor.285  The plaintiffs argued that the criminal penalty
punished Exxon only for negligence, not recklessness, and that all
the other amounts paid would have been required even if Exxon
had spilled the oil innocently.286  Furthermore, the plaintiffs con-
tended that since the jury was not allowed to consider harm to the
environment when assessing the punitive damages, Exxon’s
278. Id. at 135-36.
279. Id. at 136.
280. Id.
281. Id. at 137.
282. Id. at 138-39.
283. Id. at 142.
284. Id. at 143-45.
285. Id. at 146.
286. Id.
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cleanup expenditures should not be used to mitigate the punitive
damages award.287
D. The Ninth Circuit’s Decision to Vacate the Punitive Damages
Award and Remand for Consideration under the BMW
Guideposts
In a decision filed on November 7, 2001, the Ninth Circuit held
that although an award of punitive damages was not barred, the $5
billion jury verdict was excessive and must be reduced by the dis-
trict court upon remand.288  While the court responded to each of
the main issues raised in the parties’ briefs, the grounds for vacat-
ing the award rested on Exxon’s due process challenge to the puni-
tive damages award.289
1. The Ninth Circuit’s Due Process Fair Notice Excessiveness
Inquiry.  The Ninth Circuit began by summarizing the Supreme
Court’s due process fair notice excessiveness jurisprudence. 290  The
court noted, “Two critical Supreme Court opinions, decided after
the district court’s decision in this case, have expanded the way
courts review constitutional challenges to large punitive damages
awards.”291  The court then described the fair notice excessiveness
guideposts established by BMW and the de novo review standard
established by Cooper.292
Noting that the district court had not had the opportunity to
perform a fair notice excessiveness inquiry based upon the new cri-
teria (since neither BMW nor Cooper had yet been decided), the
Ninth Circuit stated that it lacked a “constitutional analysis by the
district court over which to exercise any de novo review.”293  The
court then remanded the issue stating, “[b]ecause we believe the
district court should, in the first instance, apply the appropriate
standards, we remand for the district court to consider the constitu-
tionality of the amount of the award in light of the guideposts es-
tablished in BMW.”294  The Ninth Circuit, however, went on to pro-
287. Id. at 146-47.  The plaintiffs made two additional arguments relating to the
punitive damages award: (1) that maritime law does not limit punitive damages,
id. at 147-48; and (2) that the manner in which the post-judgment interest was cal-
culated reduced the impact of the punitive damages award on Exxon, id. at 149.
288. Exxon II, 270 F.3d 1215, 1242, 1246-47 (9th Cir. 2001).
289. Id. at 1241.
290. Id. at 1239-41.
291. Id. at 1239.
292. Id. at 1239-40; see also discussion supra Part  II.D.
293. Exxon II, 270 F.3d at 1241.
294. Id.
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vide its own lengthy excessiveness analysis based upon BMW’s
guideposts, in order to “aid [the district court’s] consideration.”295
The Ninth Circuit first analyzed the case under the degree of
reprehensibility guidepost.  The court compared Exxon’s conduct
to that of the defendant in BMW, which the Supreme Court had
not found reprehensible enough to support the large punitive
judgment against it.296  The court noted that neither case involved
violence, nor “trickery or deceit,” and that in both cases the claims
were solely for injuries to private economic interests.297  The court
reiterated that the In re Exxon Valdez jury had been instructed to
exclude consideration of the environmental and natural resource
harm and focus only on the private economic harm when deter-
mining Exxon’s punitive damages liability.298
The Ninth Circuit found that Exxon’s conduct was reprehensi-
ble because it was aware of the risks of transporting oil through
Prince William Sound and knew Hazelwood was a relapsed alco-
holic.299  The court stated, however, that “this goes more to justify
punitive damages than to justify punitive damages at so high a
level.”300  For the court, several factors reduced the reprehensibility
of Exxon’s conduct:
Exxon spent millions of dollars to compensate many people after
the oil spill, thereby mitigating the harm to them and the repre-
hensibility of its conduct.  Reprehensibility should be discounted
if defendants act promptly and comprehensively to ameliorate
any harm they cause in order to encourage such socially benefi-
cial behavior.  Also, as bad as the oil spill was, Exxon did not
spill the oil on purpose, and did not kill anyone.301
The Ninth Circuit then turned to BMW’s second guidepost—
the ratio of the punitive damages award to the actual harm to the
plaintiff, noting that the “reasonable relationship” ratio required
by BMW is “intrinsically somewhat indeterminate” because of the
difficulty in estimating the likely harm of the defendant’s con-
duct.302  The court then accepted the district court’s range estimate
295. Id. at 1241-46.
296. Id. at 1241-42; see discussion supra Part II.C.
297. Exxon II, 270 F.3d at 1241-42.
298. Id. at 1242.
299. Id.
300. Id.  Although the court noted that Exxon had both direct liability for its
own acts and vicarious liability for Hazelwood’s acts, it stated that the comparison
of the $5000 punitive damages award against Hazelwood and the $5-billion puni-
tive damages award against Exxon raised concerns “about the jury’s evaluation of
their relative reprehensibility.” Id.
301. Id. at 1242-43.
302. Id. at 1243.
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of the total harm as $287 million to $418 million, and stated that it
“produces a ratio [to the $5 billion punitive damages award] be-
tween 12-to-1 and 17-to-1.  This ratio greatly exceeds the 4-to-1 ra-
tio that the Supreme Court called ‘close to the line’ in [Haslip].”303
The Ninth Circuit stated that the voluntary payments made by
Exxon should not be used as part of the harm estimate for pur-
poses of calculating the ratio “because that would deter settlements
prior to judgment.”304  Similarly, the court reasoned that Exxon’s
cleanup expenditures, casualty losses, fines, settlements, and com-
pensatory damages “should be considered part of the deterrent al-
ready imposed” for the spill.305  After tabulating Exxon’s costs at-
tributable to the spill at $3.4 billion, the court stated:
A company hauling a cargo worth around $25.7 million has a
large incentive to avoid a $3.4 billion expense for the trip. . . .
Just the expense, without any punishment, is too large for a pru-
dent transporter to take much of a chance, given the low cost of
making sure alcoholics do not command their oil tankers.306
For the court, BMW’s ratio guidepost helps avoid the over-
deterrence that can result from excessive punitive damages
303. Id. (quoting Pacific Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1, 23 (1991)).
304. Id. at 1244.
305. Id.  One can query why the cleanup costs should be considered as part of
the deterrent and excluded as part of the harm.  As the Ninth Circuit reminded,
the case was not about “befouling the environment,” yet only because the envi-
ronment was befouled did Exxon have to spend so much to clean it up.  If the jury
was not allowed to consider harm to the environment when determining the puni-
tive damages, why should the expenses of mitigating harm to the environment be
deducted as deterrent already imposed and used as a justification to reduce the
jury’s award?
306. Id.  The Ninth Circuit’s reasoning is dubious.  First, the court assumes that
the only risk to be avoided when transporting oil on tankers is that posed by alco-
holic masters.  In reality, the risks (and costs of avoiding those risks) are much
more prevelant.  Due to the toxic nature of crude oil, transporting it at all entails
risk.  Certainly, transporting at night, when ice is present in the shipping lanes,
with a tanker that lacked a double-hull, and with a skeleton crew, all increased the
risk that the Exxon Valdez would spill oil into Prince William Sound.  Hazel-
wood’s alcoholism was only the most direct cause of the spill on that particular
trip.  Second, the court fails to realize that it isn’t only the expense of an accident
that gives a corporation an incentive to take measures to avoid the accident,  but
rather the likelihood of such an accident.  If the likelihood of a major oil spill is
low—say one spill per every five thousand trips—and the transporter determines
that it would cost more to implement all of the preventive measures than to cover
the costs of a spill, the transporter may choose to simply risk it.  This is especially
true if much of the harm of an oil spill remains externalized.
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awards.307  The court concluded that a “lesser amount” than the $5
billion punitive damages award would be enough to deter future
bad acts by Exxon.308
Finally, the Ninth Circuit examined the case under BMW’s
“comparable sanctions” guidepost.309  The court explained that the
purpose of the guidepost is to accord “substantial deference” to
legislative judgments regarding the civil or criminal penalties “that
could be imposed for comparable misconduct.”310  Since there were
legislative statutes regarding the conduct at issue and because ac-
tual penalties had been imposed on Exxon as a result of the spill,
the court found the case to be “unusually rich in comparables.”311
The court stated that Exxon’s criminal liability for a misde-
meanor under the appropriate federal statute would be a fine of
$200,000, or as the plaintiffs argued, a fine of double the gross loss
resulting from the offense—which, under the district court’s highest
estimate of damages would result in a fine of about $1 billion.312
The court also examined the civil liabilities provided under the
federal Trans-Alaska Pipeline Act.313  The court noted that under
the Act, the maximum sanction for which a vessel owner or opera-
tor could be held strictly liable for discharging oil was $100 mil-
lion—“only 1/50 of the punitive damages award.”314  The court next
considered the $150 million plea agreement that Exxon entered
into with the United States, stating that it “represent[ed] an adver-
sarial judgment by the executive officers of the state and federal
governments who had the public responsibility for seeking the ap-
307. Id.  The Ninth Circuit appeared to favor the view that punitive damages
awards should be imposed to achieve economically optimal deterrence.  However,
this “economic efficiency” theory was discredited by the Supreme Court’s decision
in Cooper, which stated that deterrence is only one of the objectives of punitive
damages, and that juries might properly value the punishment of immoral behav-
ior above economic efficiency.  Cooper Indus., Inc. v. Leatherman Tool Group,
Inc., 532 U.S. 424, 439 (2001).  For an explanation of the economically optimal de-
terrence theory by its principal academic proponents, see Polinsky & Shavell, su-
pra note 91, at 877.
308. Exxon II, 270 F.3d at 1244.
309. Id. at 1245.
310. Id. (quoting BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 582 (1996)).
311. Id.
312. Id. (citing 18 U.S.C. § 3571(c)-(d) (2001)). The court rejected the plaintiff’s
notion that the $2.1 billion Exxon spent on the cleanup should be part of the loss
to be doubled, stating that it is damage to Exxon itself and not loss to another per-
son as required by federal statute.  Id.
313. Id. (citing 43 U.S.C. § 1653(c)(1) (1986)).
314. Id. (citing 43 U.S.C. § 1653(c)(3)).
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propriate level of punishment” and that it had been approved by
the district court as such.315
The court completed its analysis of the comparable sanctions
guidepost by discussing the maximum permissible civil penalty un-
der the federal Oil Pollution Act, which Congress passed as a result
of the Exxon Valdez oil spill to “assure that such spills would be
adequately deterred and punished in the future.”316  According to
the court, Exxon would have faced a civil penalty up to $3,000 for
each of the 261,905 barrels of oil it spilled resulting in a maximum
of $786 million.317  Each of the criminal and civil penalties the Ninth
Circuit compared are far less than the $5-billion punitive damages
award.
The Ninth Circuit concluded its due process fair notice exces-
siveness inquiry by stating that:
The $5 billion punitive damages award is too high to withstand
the review we are required to give it under BMW and Cooper
Industries.  It must be reduced.  Because these Supreme Court
decisions came down after the district court ruled, it could not
apply them.  We therefore, vacate the award and remand so that
the district court can set a lower amount in light of the BMW and
Cooper Industries standards.318
2. The Ninth Circuit’s Decision That Punitive Damages Were
Not Barred.  While the due process fair notice excessiveness issue
led the Ninth Circuit to vacate the punitive damages award and
remand for reduction, five other issues warrant mention in this Ar-
ticle.  Upon consideration of these issues, the court held that puni-
tive damages were not barred in the case.319  First, the court rejected
Exxon’s argument that punitive damages were barred under due
process because it had already been sufficiently punished and de-
terred by the criminal fines, civil sanctions, clean-up expenditures
and other costs.320 Second, the court rejected Exxon’s argument
that punitive damages are not allowed under maritime law, con-
cluding that they generally are allowable under maritime law, and
thus were included in the present case.321
Third, the Ninth Circuit rejected Exxon’s argument that puni-
tive damages were barred by res judicata as a result of its settle-
ment with the government trustees who acted as parens patriae for
315. Id. at 1245-46.
316. Id. at 1246 (citing 33 U.S.C. § 1321(b)(7)(2001)).
317. Id.
318. Id. at 1246-47.
319. Id. at 1226.
320. Id. at 1225-26.
321. Id. at 1226-27.
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natural resource damage claims brought on behalf of the public
pursuant to the Clean Water Act.322  The court stated that the con-
sent decree explicitly provided that “nothing in this agreement . . .
is intended to affect legally the claims, if any, of any person or en-
tity not a Party to this Agreement.”323  The court also noted that the
consent decree described the settlement as “compensatory and re-
medial,” rather than punitive.324
Fourth, the court distinguished Alaska Sport Fishing Ass’n v.
Exxon Corp.,325 upon which Exxon had relied for the proposition
that the consent decree had barred all future private claims for pu-
nitive damages.326  The Ninth Circuit explained that the sport fish-
ing enthusiasts in that case were barred from claiming damages on
behalf of the public for lost use of natural resources because they
were in privity with the State, which had acted as parens patriae to
protect the natural resources.327  By contrast, the In re Exxon Val-
dez plaintiffs “sued to vindicate harm to their private land and their
ability to fish commercially and for subsistence.”328  The court held
that the private claims for punitive damages therefore remained
unaffected by the consent decree settling the public natural re-
source damage claims.329
Fifth, the Ninth Circuit rejected Exxon’s contention that puni-
tive damages were preempted by federal statute, concluding that
the Clean Water Act “does not preempt a private right of action
for punitive as well as compensatory damages for damage to pri-
vate rights.”330  Specifically, the court stated that:
[A] statute providing a comprehensive scheme of public reme-
dies need not be read to preempt a preexisting common law pri-
vate remedy . . . . The absence of any private right of action in
the Act for damage from oil pollution may more reasonably be
322. Id. at 1227-28.
323. Id. at 1227 (quoting the district court’s consent decree).
324. Id.
325. 34 F.3d 769 (9th Cir. 1994).
326. Exxon II, 270 F.3d at 1227.
327. Id. at 1227-28.
328. Id. at 1228.
329. Id.
330. Id. at 1231.  To support its holding, the Ninth Circuit stated that the Clean
Water Act “expressly provides that it does not preempt common law rights to
other relief,” and quoted the following section of the Act for support: “Nothing in
this section shall restrict any right which any person (or class of persons) may have
under any statute or common law to seek enforcement of any effluent standard or
limitation or to seek any other relief.” Id. at 1230. (quoting 33 U.S.C. § 1365(e)
(1990)) (emphasis added by the court).
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construed as leaving private claims alone than as implicitly de-
stroying them.331
The court added, “What saves [the] plaintiff’s case from preemp-
tion is that the $5-billion award vindicates only private economic
and quasi-economic interests, not the public interest in punishing
harm to the environment.”332
E.  The Parties’ Arguments to the District Court Upon Remand
In memoranda to the district court, both parties reiterated
their respective positions on the due process fair notice excessive-
ness issue.333  The arguments, however, were sharply focused on the
Ninth Circuit’s application of the BMW factors and the extent to
which it was binding on the district court.334  Each party also sug-
gested new amounts for the punitive damages award.335
1. Exxon’s Memorandum.  Exxon argued that the Ninth Cir-
cuit’s due process excessiveness analysis was binding upon the dis-
trict court.336  Specifically, Exxon argued that the analysis was “not
in any sense dictum, since it is the rationale—the only explanation
the Ninth Circuit gave—for the Court’s holding that an award of $5
331. Id. at 1231.
332. Id.
333. See Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of Renewed Mo-
tion of the Defendants Exxon Mobil Corp. and Exxon Shipping Co. for Reduction
or Remittitur of Punitive Damages Award, In re Exxon Valdez, 236 F. Supp. 2d
1043 (D. Alaska 2002) (No. A89-095); Plaintiffs’ Memorandum In Opposition to
Renewed Motion of Exxon Defendants For Reduction or Remittitur of Punitive
Damages Award, Exxon III, 236 F. Supp. 2d 1043 (D. Alaska 2002) (No. A89-
045).
334. See Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of Renewed Mo-
tion of the Defendants Exxon Mobil Corp. and Exxon Shipping Co. For Reduc-
tion or Remittitur of Punitive Damages Award at 1-3, Exxon III (No. A89-095);
Plaintiffs’ Memorandum In Opposition to Renewed Motion of Exxon Defendants
for Reduction or Remittitur of Punitive Damages Award at 5-9, 13-22, Exxon III
(No. A89-045).
335. Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of Renewed Motion of
the Defendants Exxon Mobil Corp. and Exxon Shipping Co. For Reduction or
Remittitur of Punitive Damages Award at 24-25, Exxon III (No. A89-095); Plain-
tiffs’ Memorandum in Opposition to Renewed Motion of Exxon Defendants for
Reduction or Remittitur of Punitive Damages Award at 79, Exxon III (No. A89-
045).
336. Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of Renewed Motion of
the Defendants Exxon Mobil Corp. and Exxon Shipping Co. for Reduction or
Remittitur of Punitive Damages Award at 1, Exxon III (No. A89-095).
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billion was ‘too high.’”337  Exxon contended that, consistent with the
Ninth Circuit’s analysis, the district court was required to reduce
the punitive damages award to an amount between $25 million and
$40 million.338
To justify such a radical decrease in the punitive damages
award, Exxon turned to the Ninth Circuit’s application of the
BMW guideposts.339  Exxon argued that while some punitive dam-
ages could be awarded against it for the tragic oil spill, its conduct
did not involve a sufficiently high degree of reprehensibility to war-
rant a substantial punitive damages award.340  Since the Ninth Cir-
cuit found none of the aggravating factors identified in BMW as in-
dicative of particularly reprehensible conduct, Exxon argued that
only modest punitive damages were justified.341  Echoing the Ninth
Circuit, Exxon asserted that its post-spill actions mitigated the
harm to people and the environment and therefore reduced the
reprehensibility of its conduct.342  Exxon stated that the reprehensi-
bility guidepost “militates in favor of a significant reduction from
the maximum amount of punitive damages that might otherwise be
allowable under the remaining BMW guideposts . . . .”343
Next, Exxon argued that its “lack of reprehensibility” justified
only a two to one ratio of actual harm to punitive damages under
BMW’s ratio guidepost.344  Exxon contended that the Ninth Circuit
had held “that only compensatory damages awarded by judgment,
not settlements or other pre-judgment payments, count for pur-
337. Id. at 2-3.  Exxon cited ten cases for the proposition that upon remand a
district court “has no choice about how to proceed.  It ‘must implement both the
letter and the spirit of the mandate, taking into account the appellate court’s
opinion.’” Id. (quoting Vizcaino  v. U.S. District Court, 173 F.3d 713, 719 (9th Cir.
1999).
338. Id. at 3.
339. Id.
340. Id. at 3-4 (citing BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 580 (1996)).
However, in a footnote, Exxon expressed a contrary view:
[P]unitive damages were not properly awarded in this case, in any
amount.  The Ninth Circuit having rejected these arguments, they are
foreclosed in this Court, and Exxon does not now make them.  Never-
theless, this motion is without prejudice to Exxon’s position.  Should a
further appeal become necessary, Exxon expressly reserves the right to
argue, in the Court of Appeals en banc and in the Supreme Court, that
the only permissible award of punitive damages in this case is zero,
and/or that a complete new trial of punitive damages is required.
Id. at 1 n.1.
341. Id. at 5-6.
342. Id. at 6-7.
343. Id. at 7.
344. Id. at 8-9.
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poses of the ratio calculus.”345  Exxon stated that the total amount
of compensatory judgments against it was $20.3 million, which, un-
der the two to one ratio it advocated, would result in a punitive
damages award of $40 million.346  For Exxon, the Ninth Circuit’s
“rule” limiting the ratio calculus to compensatory judgments would
minimize litigation because parties who had already been compen-
sated would not clog the courts due to the “lure of punitive dam-
ages . . . nor press claims for vast sums in addition to what is neces-
sary to make them whole.”347
To justify the two to one ratio, Exxon argued that since a four
to one ratio for intentional fraud was “close to the line” in Haslip,
the ratio chosen in a case involving unintentional acts should be
much lower.348  Since the “appropriate ratio depends primarily on
the need for deterrence,” and since the spill had already cost it over
$3.4 billion, Exxon contended that the conduct had already been
deterred and, therefore, a high ratio was not justified.349  Exxon fur-
ther argued that when large compensatory damages are awarded—
345. Id. at 8.  Exxon took great license in its interpretation of the following
Ninth Circuit statement: “The amount that a defendant voluntarily pays before
judgment should generally not be used as part of the numerator, because that
would deter settlements prior to judgment.” Exxon II, 270 F.3d 1215, 1244 (9th
Cir. 2001).
346. See Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of Renewed Mo-
tion of the Defendants Exxon Mobil Corp. and Exxon Shipping Co. for Reduction
or Remittitur of Punitive Damages Award at 8-9, Exxon III, 236 F. Supp. 2d 1043
(D. Alaska 2002) (No. A89-095).  Exxon did not attempt to reconcile its loose in-
terpretation of the Ninth Circuit’s dicta with BMW’s explicit instruction that the
amount to be used in the ratio calculus is  “the actual harm inflicted on the plain-
tiff.”  BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 580 (1996).
347. See Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of Renewed Mo-
tion of the Defendants Exxon Mobil Corp. and Exxon Shipping Co. for Reduction
or Remittitur of Punitive Damages Award at 11, Exxon III, (No. A89-095).
Exxon also argued that the prejudgment payments it made to commercial fisher-
men should not be viewed as compensation for harm, but rather as measures
taken which prevented harm from occurring.  Id. at 12.  For Exxon, this was due to
the fact that the payments were made before the fishing season, rather than after
it, when fishermen usually get paid for the season’s catch.  Id.  In this regard
Exxon stated that “the only difference in [a fisherman’s] economic position from
what it would have been had there been no spill, is that he received his money
sooner.” Id. at 13.  Exxon also stated that the fishermen whom it employed during
the cleanup “had larger cash incomes than they would have earned if there had
been no spill,” a factor that it argued undermined the punitive damages award.  Id.
348. Id. at 14.
349. Id. at 14-15.
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as in the verdict here—higher ratios for punitive damages are un-
warranted.350
Next, Exxon argued that the Ninth Circuit’s analysis of the
comparable sanctions guidepost did not support the large punitive
damages award.351  Exxon reiterated that BMW required substan-
tial deference to the legislative judgments regarding appropriate
sanctions and, since the Attorney General of the United States and
the state of Alaska had already imposed a punishment based upon
those judgments, an additional larger punishment for deterrence
was neither necessary nor allowable under BMW.352  Exxon evi-
denced that under the comparable sanctions guidepost, the puni-
tive damages award could not exceed the $25 million fine that was
imposed as punishment.353
Exxon then offered its suggestion for the reduced amount:
“Applying all guideposts together, it is plain that a constitutional
punitive damages award could not possibly be greater than $40
million.  An award in a range between $25 million and $40 million
would fit the Ninth Circuit’s analysis of the law and facts, and
would reconcile the BMW guideposts.”354
2. Plaintiff’s Memorandum.  The plaintiffs argued that the
district court was not bound by the Ninth Circuit’s analysis of the
BMW guideposts because they were not explicit holdings.355  Spe-
cifically, the plaintiffs argued that the Ninth Circuit’s use of the
BMW guideposts only bound the district court to reduce the puni-
tive damages award and to conduct a due process fair notice exces-
siveness inquiry.356
The plaintiffs further contended that the remainder of the
Ninth Circuit’s opinion was merely offered as an “‘analysis to aid
[in] th[e] consideration’ of the BMW guideposts,” and therefore
was not binding.357  To support their argument, the plaintiffs
pointed to the prose and tenor of the Ninth Circuit’s decision, ar-
guing that it was couched “in abstract, tentative language, consis-
tent with [the] recognition that [the district court] is in a superior
350. Id. at 15-16.
351. Id. at 17-23.
352. Id. at 18-20.
353. Id. at 24.
354. Id.
355. Plaintiffs’ Memorandum in Opposition to Renewed Motion of Exxon De-
fendants for Reduction or Remittitur of Punitive Damages Award at 6-9, Exxon
III (No. A89-045).
356. Id. at 5-6.
357. Id. at 6 (quoting Exxon II, 270 F.3d 1215, 1241 (9th Cir. 2001).
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position to apply the law to the facts ‘in the first instance.’”358  The
plaintiffs stated that the Ninth Circuit’s analysis of “some of the
relevant factors did not purport to preempt [the district court’s]
plenary consideration of the [issue]. . . . If [it] had regarded its dis-
cussion as dispositive, it would have set the constitutional limit it-
self rather than remanding.”359
Next, the plaintiffs attempted to “aid” the district court by
providing their own lengthy due process inquiry.360  The Plaintiffs’
Memorandum reiterated previous points and raised new arguments
directed toward undermining the Ninth Circuit’s conclusion that
the punitive damages award was excessive under BMW’s guide-
posts.361  First, the plaintiffs argued that Exxon had fair notice that
its reckless and highly reprehensible conduct would “subject it to
substantial punitive damages.”362  Specifically, the plaintiffs con-
tended that Exxon’s conduct was clearly reprehensible because it
knowingly left a relapsed alcoholic in command of a supertanker,
risking vast pollution and exposing the vulnerable plaintiffs to
broad economic and non-economic harm.363  The plaintiffs also con-
tended that Exxon’s reprehensibility should not be discounted by
its pre-trial payments since they were not prompt, comprehensive,
or sincere.364
The plaintiffs further argued that the $5 billion punitive dam-
ages award was fully consistent with BMW’s ratio guidepost be-
cause the amount of the award bore a reasonable relationship to
the harm resulting from Exxon’s conduct.  On this point, the plain-
tiffs contended that the “harm” used in the ratio could properly in-
clude actual economic harm, non-economic harm, and the likely
harm that stemmed from Exxon’s reckless conduct.365  The plaintiffs
argued that the Ninth Circuit had properly refused to subtract
Exxon’s pretrial settlements when computing the actual harm, but
then took issue with the court’s statement that “[t]he cleanup ex-
penses Exxon paid should be considered as part of the deterrent
already imposed.”366  Concluding its ratio analysis, the plaintiffs ar-
gued a high ratio was justified due to the circumstances of the case
358. Id. at 6 (quoting Exxon II, 270 F.3d at 1242).
359. Id. at 8.
360. Id. at 13.
361. Id. at 14-76.
362. Id. at 13-14.
363. Id. at 14-25.
364. Id. at 31.
365. Id. at 37-45.
366. Id. at 46-51 (quoting Exxon II, 270 F.3d 1215, 1244 (9th Cir. 2001)).
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and that ratios much higher than four to one are fully consistent
with Supreme Court and Ninth Circuit precedent.367
Next, the plaintiffs turned to the comparable sanctions guide-
post, arguing that “[a] proper application of the law reveals that
Exxon had fair notice that it could be subject to criminal fines in
excess of the $5 billion punitive damages award.”368  Specifically,
the plaintiffs argued that the Ninth Circuit had not suggested that
the criminal penalty actually imposed on Exxon was the only rele-
vant sanction to be considered.369  Rather, the plaintiffs contended
that the Ninth Circuit directed the district court to consider all the
“‘penalties that could be imposed.’”370  The plaintiffs pointed out
that Exxon had fair notice that a major oil spill would expose it to
criminal and civil monetary sanctions far in excess of $5 billion
dollars and that Exxon executives, with “the responsibility and
authority to prevent acts that [could] cause a grounding,” could
have faced imprisonment for up to one year.371
In addition, the plaintiffs also argued that when performing a
BMW review, a court must look at the defendant’s financial condi-
tion.372  Specifically, the plaintiffs argued that Exxon’s financial
strength required a large punitive damages award in order to pro-
vide meaningful punishment and deterrence.373  The plaintiffs ar-
gued that Exxon’s financial resources had allowed it to delay the
litigation, impose great burdens on the plaintiffs, and profit from
the delay by earning a “handsome profit” on the money set aside to
pay the judgment.374
Finally, the plaintiffs explicitly stated their suggestion regard-
ing the reduced punitive damages award: “[The] plaintiffs recog-
nize that the Ninth Circuit has directed [the district court] to re-
duce the punitive damages award, after analyzing the BMW
guideposts.  Plaintiffs respectfully submit, however, that any reduc-
tion of the jury’s verdict below $4 billion cannot be justified under
Supreme Court precedent.”375
367. Id. at 58.
368. Id. at 64.
369. Id.
370. Id. (quoting Exxon II, 270 F.3d at 1245 (quoting BMW of N. Am., Inc. v.
Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 582 (1996))).
371. Id. at 71-73 (citing 33 U.S.C. §§ 407, 411, 1319(c) (2000)).
372. Id. at 73.
373. Id. at 74.
374. Id. at 76-77.
375. Id. at 79.
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F. The District Court’s Decision to Reduce the Punitive Damages
Award by $1 Billion
On December 9, 2002, the district court issued an order
granting Exxon’s Motion for Reduction or Remittitur of the Puni-
tive Damages Award and adopted the plaintiffs’ suggestion to re-
duce the award to $4 billion. 376  While the court acknowledged that
pursuant to the Ninth Circuit’s remand order it had to reduce the
award, it nonetheless rejected the Ninth Circuit’s conclusion that
the original award was excessive.377  Instead, the district court con-
cluded that the “award was justified by the facts of the case and is
not grossly excessive so as to deprive Exxon of fair notice—its right
to due process.”378  The court stated:
[Since this] court’s independent evaluation of the BMW factors
as applied to the facts of this case have led it to the conclusion
that the $5 billion award was not grossly excessive, the court
does not perceive any principled means by which it can reduce
that award. . . . Since the $5 billion award must be reduced, the
court adopts the plaintiffs’ position as the means of resolving
conflict between its judgment and the directions of the court of
appeals.379
Before the district court presented its due process excessive-
ness inquiry, it made several observations regarding BMW.  First,
the court noted that while application of the reprehensibility and
comparable sanctions guideposts have been relatively consistent,
appellate courts have been “willing to find a wide variety of ratios
constitutionally acceptable”—providing lower courts with little
guidance.380  Second, the court observed that a major portion of the
Supreme Court’s decision in BMW focused on limiting Alabama’s
ability to punish and deter BMW to its legitimate in-state inter-
ests—a situation unlike the present case in which no attempt was
made to punish or deter Exxon for conduct unrelated to the oil
spill in Prince William Sound.381  Third, the court observed that




380. Id. at 1052 (citing numerous cases showing the wide disparity in ratios ap-
pellate courts have upheld); see also Swinton v. Potomac Corp., 270 F.3d 794, 818-
19 (9th Cir. 2001) (concluding that a twenty-eight to one ratio was acceptable);
United Int’l Holdings Inc. v. Wharf (Holdings) Ltd., 210 F.3d 1207, 1232-33 (10th
Cir. 2000) (finding that only a .87 to one ratio was acceptable when there was a
large compensatory award); Johanson v. Combustion Eng’g, Inc., 170 F.3d 1320,
1338-39 (11th Cir. 1999) (holding that a one hundred to one ratio was acceptable).
381. Exxon III, 236 F. Supp. 2d at 1052-53 (“[T]he plaintiffs in making their
claims, this court in instructing the jury, and the jury in awarding punitive dam-
111103 CHAMBERS.DOC 12/29/03  2:00 PM
246 ALASKA LAW REVIEW [20:2
BMW “was concerned that punitive damages were determined
with reference to an inappropriate set of interests.”382  The court
noted that in the present case, proper and prescient jury instruc-
tions—unchallenged by the parties—were given, which mirrored
the guideposts subsequently embodied in BMW.383  This prevented
the jury from looking at other interests—such as environmental
concerns—which were inappropriate considerations.384  The court
summarized its instructions to the jury as follows:
The jury was instructed on the purpose of punitive damages:
punishment and deterrence.  The jury was admonished not to be
arbitrary: punitive damages must have a rational basis in the rec-
ord and bear a reasonable relationship to harm done or likely to
result from the defendant’s conduct.  The jury also was in-
structed on the subjects of reprehensible conduct and considera-
tion of mitigation (as by voluntary payments) and some compari-
son to other available sanctions.385
Finally, the district court observed that the situation was unlike
BMW, in which the defendant potentially faced “overdeterrence”
as a result of different plaintiffs seeking multiple punitive damages
awards based on the same conduct.386  Rather, in the present case,
the mandatory punitive damages class prevented Exxon from being
exposed to such multiple suits for punitive damages.387
Turning to the BMW guideposts, the district court first dis-
cussed Exxon’s reprehensibility.388  The court found that while
Exxon’s conduct was non-violent and unintentional, it nonetheless
was highly reprehensible since Exxon officials “deliberately per-
mit[ed] a relapsed alcoholic to continue operating a vessel carrying
over 53 million gallons of volatile, toxic crude oil,” while knowing
the effects that a major oil spill would have on Prince William
Sound.389  The court concluded:
On the BMW hierarchy of reprehensibility, Exxon’s conduct,
while not reaching the top, falls just short.  Its conduct was
criminal.  Exxon’s decision to leave Captain Hazelwood in com-
mand of the Exxon Valdez demonstrated reckless disregard for
the livelihood, health, and safety of the residents of Prince Wil-
ages, were all focused upon the appropriate, relevant interests for which deter-
rence and punishment through punitive damages is permissible.”).
382. Id. at 1053.
383. Id.
384. Id. at 1054.
385. Id. at 1053.
386. Id. at 1054.
387. Id.
388. Id.
389. Id. at 1055-56.
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liam Sound, the crew of the Exxon Valdez, and others.  Exxon’s
conduct was highly reprehensible.390
Next, the district court analyzed the ratio guidepost, noting
that under BMW, the compensatory side of the ratio included both
the “actual harm to the victim and the harm that was likely to oc-
cur”—something the jury in the present case had been instructed to
consider.391  The district court concluded that the harm estimate
was not limited to the compensatory damage award, but also in-
cluded other recoveries.392  By its own calculations, the district court
found the total compensated harm to be $507 million.393
The court then took issue with what it called “the most trou-
bling aspect” of the Ninth Circuit’s decision: in applying BMW’s ra-
tio analysis, the Ninth Circuit stated that a court should subtract
from the harm side the amount of voluntary payments made by a
defendant, in order to encourage pretrial settlements.394  The dis-
trict court rejected this proposition, and found that the weight of
judicial authority supported the opposite conclusion—that pay-
ments made prior to judgment are included when calculating the
harm side of the ratio.395  The district court found the Ninth Cir-
cuit’s reasoning illogical and stated that discounting voluntary
payments would reduce a defendant’s risk of going to trial, thereby
encouraging trials and deterring settlements.396
The district court contended that deducting voluntary pay-
ments from the harm was not appropriate in the present case be-
cause the jury had been given specific instructions to guide it in de-
termining the appropriate amount of punitive damages.397
Specifically, the court pointed out that the jury was instructed to
consider mitigating factors, such as payments the defendant made
to compensate victims and the cost of remedial measures.398  The
court noted that it must presume the jury understood and followed
the instructions to the best of its ability, stating:
Presumably the jury already considered whether and to what ex-
tent punitive damages would be mitigated based on voluntary
payments by Exxon before judgment.  Reducing actual harm . . .
unfairly skews the ratio in Exxon’s favor, and in effect gives
Exxon double credit for voluntary payments by reducing both
390. Id. at 1057.
391. Id.
392. Id. at 1058-60.
393. Id. at 1060.
394. Id.
395. Id.
396. Id. at 1061.
397. Id.
398. Id.
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punitive damages and actual harm for purposes of the . . . ratio
analysis.  In this case, the court concludes that it should not dis-
count actual harm by voluntary payments made by Exxon.399
The district court next pointed out that there was additional
harm above the $507 million in compensated harm that should be
included in the total harm figure and ratio analysis.400  First, the
court noted that Exxon’s recklessness caused more than mere eco-
nomic harm to the 32,677 claimants, who were not merely “de-
ceived about the quality of the paint on a new car[,]” but whose
lives were disrupted.401  The court noted that the oil spill caused so-
cial conflict, cultural disruption, and psychological stress in the af-
fected communities.402  Second, the court noted that some plaintiffs,
reinstated into the class action, had not yet had their damages de-
termined, but that significant harm was likely.403  Third, the court
noted that it is impossible to calculate the potential harm that might
have occurred if more oil had spilled.404 The court stated:
Because there is no way to quantify the non-economic, likely or
potential harms discussed above, the appropriate approach is to
proceed with the ratio calculation, but to accommodate the un-
knowns by allowing a higher ratio to pass muster . . . . In BMW,
the Court observed that “[a] higher ratio may . . . be justified in
cases in which the injury is hard to detect or the monetary value
of non-economic harm might have been difficult to deter-
mine.”405
Even without considering additional harm, however, the dis-
trict court noted that the $5 billion punitive damages award, along
with its $507 million compensated harm total, produces a harm-to-
punitive ratio of 9.85 to one. 406  Such a ratio follows both Supreme
Court and Ninth Circuit precedents.407
Subsequently, the district court responded to the Ninth Cir-
cuit’s statement that BMW’s ratio analysis helps avoid overdeter-
rence.408  The Ninth Circuit’s suggestion that economically optimum
deterrence had already been achieved due to Exxon’s casualty
losses, cleanup expenses, fines, and settlement payments was re-
399. Id.
400. Id. at 1062-64.
401. Id. at 1062.
402. Id.
403. Id. at 1062-63.
404. Id.
405. Id. at 1063.
406. Id.
407. Id.
408. Id. (citing Exxon II, 270 F.3d 1215, 1244 (9th Cir. 2001).
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jected by the district court.409  It viewed the appellate court’s eco-
nomic analysis as only “mak[ing] sense in the abstract or academic
world[,]” and that “what it theoretically takes to deter a rational
business person (cleanup costs, etc.), and what it takes to deter
corporate officials given to reckless conduct are very different.”410
The district court also considered the way in which Exxon’s fi-
nancial strength should factor into the ratio analysis.411  The court
noted that while “punitive damages are intended to punish and de-
ter, they are not intended to be an economic death sentence.”412
The court, however, concluded that given Exxon’s financial status,
the $5 billion award would not be a death sentence and was neces-
sary to deter Exxon from further continued recklessness in its
transport of oil through Prince William Sound.413  In concluding its
ratio analysis, the court stated that a ten to one punitive damages
ratio was justified under the circumstances of the case and that the
$5 billion award did not excessively deter or excessively punish
Exxon.414
Finally, the district court examined the case under BMW’s
comparable sanctions guidepost.  The court noted that Exxon had
been charged with five counts of violating federal criminal statutes,
had pled guilty to three counts, and had paid a $25 million fine and
$100 million in restitution.415  The court stated, however, that since
due process “fair notice” is the focus of the comparable sanctions
analysis, the potential sanctions are the proper criteria to con-
sider.416  In this regard, the court noted that under each of the five
federal criminal offenses, Exxon might have been fined “twice the
gross [pecuniary] loss” occasioned by the spill, resulting in fines
that could have exceeded the “jury’s punitive damages award in
this civil case.”417  The court also noted that federal law provides for
imprisonment—”a recognized legislative signal of heightened seri-
ousness of the offense.”418  The court concluded its comparable
sanctions analysis by stating, “the court is well satisfied that Exxon
was quite fairly on notice that its officers could face imprisonment
and the company could face in excess of $5 billion in criminal and
409. Id. at 1064.
410. Id.
411. Id. at 1064-65.
412. Id. at 1065.
413. Id.
414. Id.
415. Id. at 1066.
416. Id.
417. Id. at 1066-67 (citing 18 U.S.C. § 3571(d) (2000)).
418. Id. at 1067 (citing 18 U.S.C. § 3551).
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civil penalties for recklessly spilling crude oil into Prince William
Sound.”419
G. Appeal and Remand: Order for Reconsideration in Light of
State Farm v. Campbell
Exxon, apparently unsatisfied with the $1 billion reduction of
the $5 billion award, appealed the district court’s decision.420  The
plaintiffs, at the district court’s urging, cross-appealed, presumably
seeking to have the original verdict reinstated or to obtain a
smaller reduction.421  On August 18, 2003, before the parties even
submitted appellate briefs, the Ninth Circuit vacated the district
court’s judgment and remanded the case so that the district court
could reconsider the $4 billion award in light of State Farm,422 de-
cided by the Supreme Court in April 2003.423
Exxon argued against a remand, pointing out that since a
challenge to the district court’s application of State Farm would re-
quire de novo review by the Ninth Circuit, a remand would be a
waste of judicial resources.424  The plaintiffs argued that the court
should remand again so that the district court could apply the State
Farm decision.425  The plaintiffs also argued that since Exxon would
likely make new arguments based on State Farm, a limited remand
to the district court was appropriate.426
419. Id.
420. While the plaintiffs’ judgment continues to earn interest, Exxon long ago
posted a $6.75-billion supersedeas bond to cover the judgment, so it has little to
lose by seeking further reduction in the punitive damages award.  Id. at 1050.
421. See id. at 1069 n.88 (stating: “[I]f Exxon chooses to take a further appeal
for the purpose of seeking a more generous reduction of the jury’s punitive dam-
ages award, then the court urges the plaintiffs to cross-appeal, for, if left to apply
BMW without the requirement that it effect some reduction of the $5 billion puni-
tive damages award, this court would have . . . denied Exxon any relief what-
ever.”).
422. 123 S. Ct. 1513 (2003).
423. See Exxon IV, No. 03-35166, at 1 (9th Cir. Aug. 18, 2003) (Order).
424. Exxon’s Letter Brief, Exxon II, 270 F.3d 1215 (9th Cir. 2001) (Nos. 03-
35166, 03-35219).
425. Plaintiffs/Appellees-Cross-Appellants’ Letter Brief Concerning Sugges-
tion to Remand this Appeal to the District Court in Light of State Farm Decision
at 1, Exxon IV (Nos. 03-35166, 03-35219).
426. Id.  Exxon also argued that if the court decided to remand the case, the
judgment of the district court should be vacated so that Exxon would not continue
to incur the cost of the letter of credit it posted in order to stay execution of the
judgment during its appeal. Id.  Exxon explained that “[c]ontinuing to post that
letter of credit costs Exxon approximately $19,750 per day or about $1.8 million
per quarter.” Id.
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On August 26, 2003, after learning of the remand, the district
court issued an order requesting that supplemental briefs from the
parties “shall provide the court with such additional arguments
based upon State Farm as the parties deem appropriate.”427  The
district court’s order also established the brief and oral argument
schedule, which is slated to be completed before the end of 2003.428
It is unlikely that the district court’s analysis of State Farm will
compel it to reduce the $5 billion punitive damages award further
than its previous $1 billion remittitur.  As will be explained in Part
V, In re Exxon Valdez does not raise the issues of extraterritoriality
and multiple punishment—two problems paramount to the Su-
preme Court’s conclusion that the punitive damage award was ex-
cessive in State Farm.429
Furthermore, in State Farm, the Supreme Court declined the
opportunity to impose a bright-line formula that courts could apply
when examining the ratio guidepost.430  Since the district court con-
cluded that the total compensated harm was $507 million, a $4 bil-
lion punitive damages award would result in only a “single-digit
multiplier,” which the State Farm Court stated is “more likely to
comport with due process” than a double-digit ratio.431  Although
the State Farm Court stated that “[w]hen compensatory damages
are substantial, then a lesser ratio, perhaps only equal to compen-
satory damages, can reach the outmost limit of the due process
guarantee[,]” it was also careful to note that the punitive damages
award “must be based upon the facts and circumstances” of the
case and not on comparisons to ratios that were upheld in dissimi-
lar cases.432  While the State Farm plaintiffs consisted of one family,
the In re Exxon Valdez plaintiffs number in the thousands.  This
fact is likely to persuade the district court that a higher single-digit
ratio (such as eight to one or nine to one) is warranted in the case,
even though the compensated damages were substantial.
427. Exxon V, No. A89-0095-CV, at 2 (D. Alaska Aug. 26, 2003) (Order for
Further Proceedings on Punitive Damages Award).
428. Id.
429. See infra Part V.A.1; see also supra notes 150-171 and accompanying text.
430. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 123 S.Ct 1513, 1524 (2003).
431. Id.
432. Id.
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V.  IN RE EXXON VALDEZ: QUESTIONS RAISED (AND NOT
RAISED) REGARDING DUE PROCESS EXCESSIVENESS
REVIEW OF PUNITIVE DAMAGE AWARDS
A. Questions Not Raised in In re Exxon Valdez: Extraterritorial-
ity and Multiple Punishment
When examining the Ninth Circuit and the district court deci-
sions in In re Exxon Valdez, two important issues relating to due
process excessiveness review are noticeably absent—extraterritori-
ality and the multiple punishment problem.  These issues provided
the Supreme Court with added justification to overturn punitive
damages awards that it viewed as excessive in both BMW and State
Farm.433
1. Extraterritoriality.  According to the Supreme Court, both
defendants in BMW and State Farm were improperly subjected to
punitive damages awards that punished them for their company-
wide policies conducted outside the jurisdiction of the respective
state courts.434  Unlike the defendants in BMW and State Farm,
Exxon was not punished for extraterritorial conduct unrelated to
its in-state conduct that caused specific harm to the plaintiffs.
BMW was premised in large part upon the Court’s require-
ment that punitive damages only be awarded to vindicate “legiti-
mate interests”—which did not include punishing BMW for its law-
ful out-of-state conduct.435 BMW left open the question of whether
a state can punish a defendant for unlawful out-of-state conduct.436
In the interim between BMW and State Farm, two circuit courts
addressed the issue and held that a defendant may not be punished
for unlawful extraterritorial conduct.437
In State Farm, the Supreme Court followed suit and further
curtailed the State’s authority to impose punitive damages awards,
by deciding that Utah may not punish State Farm for unlawful ex-
traterritorial conduct.438  The Court vacated the punitive damages
award in large part because evidence was presented to the jury re-
garding unlawful acts committed by State Farm outside Utah that
433. See supra Parts II.C., II.E.
434. See BMW of N. Am. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 572-74 (1996); State Farm, 123
S. Ct. at 1522-23.
435. BMW, 517 U.S. at 568.
436. OLSON, supra note 39, at 22.
437. See White v. Ford Motor Co., 312 F.3d. 998 (9th Cir. 2002); Continental
Trend Resources, Inc. v. OXY USA Inc., 101 F.3d 634 (10th Cir. 1996).
438. State Farm, 123 S. Ct. at 1522.
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did not have a “nexus to the specific harm suffered by the plain-
tiff.”439  In other words, the Supreme Court found that extraterrito-
rial evidence of a defendant’s reprehensible acts that are unrelated
to the harm done to a plaintiff “may not serve as the basis for puni-
tive damages.”440  This decision further reduces the risk that a state
will be able to punish a defendant for reprehensible acts committed
outside of its jurisdiction through the imposition of punitive dam-
ages awards.
2. The Multiple Punishment Problem.  A second evolving is-
sue that was absent from In re Exxon Valdez is whether due proc-
ess is violated when a defendant is subjected to multiple punitive
damages awards because of “repeated imposition of punishment
for the same act or course of conduct.”441  As the district court
pointed out, the creation of a mandatory punitive damages class
prevented Exxon from being subject to multiple punitive damages
awards.442
A recent example of the multiple punishment problem sur-
faced in State Farm.443  In addition to the fair notice and extraterri-
torial aspects of the due process right, State Farm raised the issue of
whether—and at what point—a defendant’s due process rights are
violated when the party is subject to multiple punitive damages
awards arising in different cases, but stemming from the same con-
duct.444  That State Farm potentially faced multiple punitive dam-
ages awards for its fraudulent nationwide policies led the Court to
place restrictions on the use of evidence of lawful and unlawful out-
of-state conduct.445  Specifically, the Court stated that such out-of-
state conduct “must have a nexus to the specific harm suffered by
the plaintiff.”446
While it had been rejected by many courts, a due process right
against multiple punitive damages awards was gaining ground even
439. Id.
440. Id. at 1523.
441. OLSON, supra note 39, at 21.
442. Exxon II, 270 F.3d 1215, 1225 (9th Cir. 2001); see generally Laura J. Hines,
Obstacles to Determining Punitive Damages In Class Actions, 36 WAKE FOREST L.
REV. 889 (2001) (describing the procedural and substantive obstacles to resolving
punitive damages in class actions, including cases utilizing mandatory classes).
443. State Farm, 123 S. Ct. at 1523; see also supra notes 157-160 and accompa-
nying text.
444. State Farm, 123 S. Ct. at 1523.
445. Id. at 1522-23.
446. Id. at 1522.
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prior to State Farm.447  In 1997, Judge Posner, writing for the Sev-
enth Circuit, noted that the Supreme Court’s evolving due process
excessiveness jurisprudence threatened the traditional view that
multiple punitive damages awards do not violate due process.448
Posner stated: “[I]t could be argued that a piling on of awards by
different courts for the same act might result in excessive punish-
ment for that act.”449  Some commentators have suggested that a
constitutional prohibition on multiple punitive damages awards is a
logical extension of BMW; since punitive damages may only be im-
posed to further a state’s legitimate interests in punishment and de-
terrence and since previous punitive damages awards may already
have vindicated those interests, a state may sometimes be barred
from imposing any new punitive damages award.450  At some point
“the aggregate amount of multiple punitive awards may surpass a
constitutional threshold.”451 State Farm clarifies that use of evidence
of a defendant’s out-of-state conduct is quite limited—a decision
which should reduce the risk that a defendant will be subject to
multiple punitive damages awards stemming from the same con-
duct.
B. Questions Raised Regarding Due Process Excessiveness Re-
view
In re Exxon Valdez raises many questions regarding due proc-
ess excessiveness review.  This Article points to many of them
when discussing the parties’ arguments and the courts’ decisions.452
However, five other questions addressed below warrant more ex-
447. Thomas B. Colby, Beyond The Multiple Punishment Problem: Punitive
Damages As Punishment For Individual, Private Wrongs, 87 MINN. L. REV. 583,
587 (2003) (noting that “numerous cases and articles have wrestled with the ques-
tion of whether and in what circumstances a state may subject a defendant to mul-
tiple punitive damages awards for the same conduct”); see also Owens-Corning
Fiberglas Corp. v. Malone, 972 S.W.2d 35, 48-50 (Tex. 1998) (providing a list of
cases with dicta suggesting that multiple punitive damages awards for the same
conduct is unconstitutional, when the total amount of punitive damages exceeds
the amount necessary to achieve the state’s legitimate interests in punishment and
deterrence).  But see Dunn v. Hovic, 1 F.3d 1371, 1385-86 (3d Cir. 1993) (provid-
ing a list of decisions holding that multiple punitive damages awards stemming
from the same conduct are not unconstitutional).
448. In re Brand Name Prescription Drugs Antitrust Litig., 123 F.3d 599, 609
(7th Cir. 1997).
449. Id.; see also OLSON, supra note 39, at 21.
450. See Colby, supra note 447, at 651 n.257; see also BMW of N. Am., Inc. v.
Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 568 (1996).
451. Owens-Corning, 972 S.W.2d at 51.
452. See supra Parts II., IV.
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tensive consideration.  The first three of these questions suggest a
need for critical examination of the effects of the Supreme Court’s
due process excessiveness jurisprudence.  The final two questions
raise issues that are likely to lead to further evolution of that juris-
prudence.
1. Do BMW’s Guideposts Lead to Uniformity?  The BMW
guideposts offer flexibility by allowing courts to determine whether
or not a given punitive damages award is excessive through a case-
by-case consideration of factual circumstances.453  In theory, this
approach balances the reviewing court’s goal of vindicating the
state’s legitimate interests in punishment and deterrence with the
goal of imposing a punitive damages award that does not violate
the defendant’s due process right to fair notice.  Since each case is
unique, a wide range of punitive damages awards will be upheld.
The Supreme Court, in rejecting strict mathematical formulas and
favoring flexibility, appears comfortable with the disparity in the
sizes and ratios of punitive damages that lower courts have upheld
in different cases.  It is not the outcome of different cases that
should be uniform, but rather the excessiveness review itself, which
the Supreme Court attempted to provide when articulating the
BMW guideposts.454
In re Exxon Valdez raises the question of whether the flexible
guideposts afford so much discretion that they undermine the goal
of uniformity.  Both the district court and the Ninth Circuit applied
the BMW guideposts to the same case.455  The results of those ex-
cessiveness inquiries however, were far different: the Ninth Circuit
concluded that the $5 billion punitive damages award was so exces-
sive that it violated Exxon’s due process right to fair notice; the dis-
trict court concluded that the award was not excessive, but rather
fully justified and not in violation of any constitutional right.456  This
Article has provided a detailed description of the reasoning behind
each court’s excessiveness inquiry in order to show that application
of BMW’s guideposts can lead to opposite conclusions.457
453. See supra notes 90-91 and accompanying text.
454. Mark A. Klugheit, “Where the Rubber Meets the Road”: Theoretical Justi-
fications vs. Practical Outcomes in Punitive Damages Litigation, 52 SYRACUSE L.
REV. 803, 825 (2002) (“The three BMW guideposts were, undoubtedly, an attempt
to bring order, objectivity and some predictability to awards of punitive dam-
ages . . . by providing standards for judicial review.”).
455. Exxon II, 270 F.3d 1215, 1239-40 (9th Cir. 2001); Exxon III, 236 F. Supp.
2d 1043, 1068 (D. Alaska 2002).
456. Exxon II, 270 F.3d at 1242, 1246-47; Exxon III, 236 F. Supp. 2d at 1068.
457. See supra Parts IV.D.–IV.E.
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In re Exxon Valdez’s striking lack of uniformity in the applica-
tion of the BMW guideposts is partially resolved by the de novo
standard of review dictated by the Supreme Court in Cooper In-
dustries, Inc. v. Leatherman Tool Group Inc.458  Thus, the Ninth
Circuit’s excessiveness review trumps the district court’s.  How-
ever, while Cooper avoids a judicial impasse, it does nothing to re-
solve the underlying uniformity problem: courts may still reach
vastly different damages determinations from the same factual cir-
cumstances.
In a dissenting opinion in BMW, Justice Scalia stated:
[T]he ‘guideposts’ mark a road to nowhere . . . . The Court has
constructed a framework that does not genuinely constrain, that
does not inform state legislatures and lower courts—that does
nothing at all except confer an artificial air of doctrinal analysis
upon its essentially ad hoc determination that this particular
award of punitive damages was not ‘fair.’459
As Justice Scalia implied, the broad question of whether or not a
punishment is fair is a subjective consideration.  The BMW guide-
posts—especially the ratio and comparable sanctions guideposts—
offer a modest degree of mandatory objectivity for the specific
question of whether an award is so excessive that it deprives the
defendant of the due process right to fair notice.460  Since applica-
tion of the guideposts is flexible, however, the initial subjective
consideration of fairness may erode what little objectivity is offered
by the guideposts.  Some commentators suggest that the BMW
guideposts have provided at least a measure of uniformity and ob-
jectivity by giving courts guidance where none previously existed.461
Others, however, have concluded that BMW has not resulted in
greater objectivity or precision.462  One commentator stated:
458. 532 U.S. 424, 436 (2001) (stating a de novo standard of review is proper
when reviewing a district court’s determination of the constitutionality of a puni-
tive damages award).
459. BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 605-06 (1996) (Scalia, J., dis-
senting).
460. See Jonathan Gross & Jeffrey D. Hayes, What Punitive Damages Message
is the U.S. Supreme Court Sending?, 69 DEF. COUNS. J. 447, 450 (2002) (describing
BMW’s  reprehensibility guidepost and suggesting a strategy for defense counsel:
“There is no objective test for reprehensibility.  Instead, it is a subjective conclu-
sion, and good rhetorical skills can influence the outcome of this decision.  In ad-
dition, a punitive damages defendant should make a record at trial of any miti-
gating factors that later can be argued on appeal.  An example comes from the
Exxon Valdez case.”).
461. Turner, supra note 55, at 449 (stating that BMW “instilled a modicum of
order into the previous chaos”).
462. Klugheit, supra note 454, at 826.
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Since the Supreme Court has not offered its own guidance on
how its three BMW factors . . . are to be applied, it is these state
and federal decisions arising out of post-BMW remands that il-
lustrate the consequences of BMW for the real world . . . [which]
remain, much as before, replete with opportunity for inconsis-
tency, irrationality, and uncertainty.463
While the guideposts may not lead to uniformity and objectiv-
ity, they at least focus a court’s due process excessiveness review.
In addition, each due process excessiveness case that reaches the
Supreme Court offers a fresh opportunity for the court to further
refine the BMW analysis and provide further parameters for lower
courts.  The Court’s recent decision in State Farm illustrates that
the due process jurisprudence is not static.  Future appellate and
Supreme Court decisions will likely continue to refine BMW’s
guideposts and add to the due process excessiveness inquiry in a
way that increases uniformity.  Increased guidance, however,
comes at a price.  As Justice Ginsburg noted in her State Farm dis-
sent, the flexible guideposts prescribed in BMW have been swiftly
converted into instructions that resemble “marching orders.”464  In-
creasing guidance erodes the respect and restraint usually accorded
to the states’ determinations regarding punitive damages.465
2. Is De Novo Review Appropriate?  In Cooper, the Supreme
Court resolved a circuit split concerning whether the abuse of dis-
cretion or the de novo standard should be applied when an appel-
late court reviews a district court’s determination of the constitu-
tionality of a punitive damages award.466  The Cooper Court held
that the de novo standard should be applied.467  The Court justified
its holding by stating that “[c]onsiderations of institutional compe-
tence fail to tip the balance in favor of deferential appellate re-
view.”468  The Court stated that district courts only have an advan-
tage over courts of appeals when examining BMW’s
reprehensibility guidepost, “and even then the advantage exists
primarily with respect to issues turning on witness credibility and
demeanor.”469  The Court then stated that both trial and appellate
463. Id. at 832.
464. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 123 S. Ct. 1513, 1531 (2003)
(Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
465. Id.
466. Cooper Indus., Inc. v. Leatherman Tool Group, Inc., 532 U.S. 424, 431
(2001).
467. Id. at 436.
468. Id. at 440.
469. Id.
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courts are equally capable of analyzing BMW’s ratio guidepost.470
Finally, the Court concluded that the appellate courts were better
suited to analyze the comparable sanctions guidepost, since it calls
for broad legal comparisons.471
In re Exxon Valdez offers a striking example of a district court
and an appellate court reaching far different conclusions after
analyzing the BMW guideposts.  Each court conducted its analysis
utilizing different underlying premises regarding the guideposts
themselves.  In other words, the application of the guideposts was
not uniform.  Perhaps more importantly, even when the separate
inquiries were alike, the courts reached opposite conclusions re-
garding the constitutionality of the punitive damages award.
In re Exxon Valdez raises the question of whether a de novo
review is appropriate.  If the appellate courts have superior compe-
tence to conduct an excessiveness inquiry based on BMW’s guide-
posts—as the Court implicitly held in Cooper—one should be able
to point to specific aspects of the two excessiveness inquiries of In
re Exxon Valdez in order to show that superiority.  First, where did
the district court’s analysis fall short?  Second, how did the appel-
late court provide a more insightful analysis of BMW’s guideposts?
Although the differences in the courts’ respective inquiries can
readily be pointed out—as this Article has done—it is more diffi-
cult to find reasons why considerations of institutional competence
favor the appellate court by looking at In re Exxon Valdez.
If the excessiveness review in a given case hinges on the repre-
hensibility guidepost, perhaps the district court’s excessiveness in-
quiry should be given greater deference than the de novo standard
provides.  After all, the Cooper Court stated that reprehensibility
was best analyzed by the district court.  Arguably, reprehensibility
was the most important guidepost in In re Exxon Valdez.  If institu-
tional competence favors letting the district court decide, why
should de novo review supplant the more competent analysis of the
district court with the less competent analysis of the appellate
court?
As previously discussed, the excessiveness inquiry is necessar-
ily somewhat arbitrary and subjective due to the flexibility inherent
in the guideposts themselves.  De novo review, however, should do
more than substitute the appellate court’s analysis of the BMW
guideposts for that of the district court.  If de novo review is the
appropriate standard, one should be able to see how it facilitates a
more insightful and accurate assessment of the constitutionality of
470. Id.
471. Id.
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a given punitive damages award.  When examining the excessive-
ness inquiries conducted in In re Exxon Valdez, it is unclear
whether de novo review achieved these aims.  On the other hand,
over time de novo review may offer the advantage of more consis-
tent application of the BMW guideposts, especially as the require-
ments and limitations of the due process excessiveness inquiry are
further refined.472
3. Does Excessiveness Review Needlessly Undermine the Role
of the Jury?  De novo review provides a greater check on the jury’s
determination of punitive damages awards (and the trial court’s
subsequent review of the award) than the abuse of discretion stan-
dard.473  When adopting de novo review, the Cooper Court ad-
dressed concerns that de novo review infringes on the Seventh
Amendment right to a jury trial.474  The Cooper Court reasoned
that the jury’s determination of the appropriate amount of punitive
damages is not a finding of fact, which would implicate the Seventh
Amendment’s Reexamination Clause.475  Specifically, the Court
stated that “[a] jury’s assessment of [compensatory damages] is es-
sentially a factual determination, whereas its imposition of punitive
damages is an expression of its moral condemnation.”476  In addi-
tion, the Court stated that as the types of compensatory damages
available have increased, punitive damages have come to serve “a
more purely punitive (and therefore less factual)” purpose.477  The
Cooper Court also stated that determination of the amount neces-
sary to achieve deterrence is not a pure question of fact since the
jury may legitimately have broader concerns than simply economi-
cally optimum deterrence.478
Justice Ginsburg, the lone dissenter in Cooper, argued that
only the abuse of discretion standard should be applied since the
“jury’s verdict on punitive damages is fundamentally dependent on
472. But see Lisa M. White, A Wrong Turn on the Road to Tort Reform: The
Supreme Court’s Adoption of De Novo Review in Cooper Industries v. Leather-
man Tool Group, Inc., 68 BROOK. L. REV. 885, 921-23 (2003) (concluding that de
novo review will not provide different results than the abuse of discretion stan-
dard and stating that the abuse of discretion standard is sufficiently rigorous to
scrutinize excessive punitive damages awards).
473. See Cooper, 532 U.S. at 436.
474. Id. at 437; see also U.S. CONST. amend. VII.
475. Cooper, 532 U.S. at 437; see also Leading Cases, 115 HARV. L. REV. 306,
359 (2001).
476. Cooper, 532 U.S. at 432.
477. Id. at 438 n.11.
478. Id. at 439.
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determinations we characterize as factfindings.”479  Justice Ginsburg
pointed out that the determination of a punitive damages award is
no less factual than a determination of non-economic compensa-
tory awards such as pain and suffering: “Both derive their meaning
from a set of underlying facts as determined by a jury.  If one exer-
cise in quantification is properly regarded as factfinding . . . it
seems to me the other should be so regarded as well.”480  The fac-
tual bases underlying a punitive damages award include “the extent
of harm or potential harm caused by the defendant’s misconduct,
whether the defendant acted in good faith, whether the misconduct
was an individual instance or part of a broader pattern, [and]
whether the defendant behaved negligently, recklessly, or mali-
ciously.”481
The Cooper Court enumerated the following factors that the
jury had been instructed to consider: (1) the character of the de-
fendant’s conduct; (2) the defendant’s motive; (3) the amount nec-
essary to achieve specific and general deterrence; and (4) the de-
fendant’s income and assets.482  The Court then stated that,
“Although the jury’s application of these instructions may have de-
pended on specific findings of fact, nothing in our decision today
suggests that the Seventh Amendment would permit a court, in re-
viewing a punitive damages award, to disregard such jury find-
ings.”483
In re Exxon Valdez raises the question of the extent of the
jury’s role in determining punitive damages and whether that role
has been needlessly undermined by an excessiveness inquiry con-
ducted under the de novo standard of review.  If the jury made spe-
cific findings of fact in applying these instructions when determin-
ing the amount of punitive damages, is it proper for a reviewing
court to disregard those factual findings?  As the district court
pointed out, the In re Exxon Valdez jury was given explicit instruc-
tions regarding the factors they were to consider, which presciently
mirrored BMW’s guideposts.484  Specifically, the district court
charged the jury that: (1) the purposes of a punitive damages award
are punishment and deterrence; (2) it could not arbitrarily set the
amount of the award; (3) the award must have a rational basis in
the record; (4) the award must bear a reasonable relationship to
the harm done or be likely to result from the defendant’s conduct;
479. Id. at 446 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
480. Id. at 446-47 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (internal citations omitted).
481. Id. at 446.
482. Id. at 439 n.12.
483. Id. (citations omitted).
484. Exxon III, 236 F. Supp. 2d 1043, 1053 (D. Alaska 2002).
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(5) the award should reflect the reprehensibility of the defendant’s
conduct; and (6) it could consider whether prior payments and
sanctions mitigated that reprehensibility.485
If a jury is instructed in a manner that incorporates BMW’s
guideposts, query whether its punitive damages award—arguably
based on a series of factual determinations—should be disregarded
as long as it is not a result that “no reasonable juror” would reach.
For example, if the jury is informed about BMW’s “hierarchy of
reprehensibility” and the range of punitive-to-harm ratios that
have been upheld in similar cases, and it is provided with a laundry
list of the sanctions available for comparable conduct, does it make
sense to disregard the jury’s final determination of the appropriate
level of punitive damages, which are based on these underlying fac-
tual determinations?
Although writing long before the BMW guideposts were ar-
ticulated, Justice O’Connor, in her dissenting opinion in Haslip,
criticized the broad discretion given to juries, stating that “[w]hile I
do not question the general legitimacy of punitive damages, I see a
strong need to provide juries with standards to constrain their dis-
cretion so that they may exercise their power wisely, not capri-
ciously or maliciously.”486  On the other hand, at least one observer
has concluded that additional jury instructions will fail to produce
fewer excessive punitive damages awards since jurors often have
difficulty with their instructions.487
Perhaps the distinction between procedural and substantive
due process rights helps resolve this issue.  As one scholar ex-
plained, “Procedural due process requires that there be safeguards
such as instructions to the jury to guide their discretion, and judi-
cial review to assure the reasonableness of the awards.  Substantive
due process prevents excessive punitive damages awards, regard-
less of the procedures followed.”488  While the instructions the dis-
trict court gave to the In re Exxon Valdez jury may have fully pro-
tected Exxon’s procedural due process rights, they still may have
failed to protect Exxon’s substantive due process right against ex-
cessive punitive damages awards.
Nonetheless, it is difficult to see why a defendant’s substantive
due process right cannot be protected when the district court re-
views the jury award under the “no reasonable juror” standard, or
485. Id.
486. Pac. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1, 43 (1990) (O’Connor, J., dis-
senting).
487. Jennifer K. Robbennolt, Determining Punitive Damages: Empirical In-
sights and Implications for Reform, 50 BUFF. L. REV. 103, 190 (2002).
488. See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 11, at 420.
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if necessary, when an appellate court applies an abuse of discretion
standard when reviewing the district court’s excessiveness inquiry.
A constitutionally excessive punitive damages award should not
survive these reviews.489 The higher de novo standard may need-
lessly allow an appellate court to substitute its own factually based
determination of the appropriate amount of punitive damages for
that of the jury.
Some commentators have suggested the more radical solution
of splitting the responsibilities over punitive damage determina-
tions between the judge and the jury. 490  Under one proposal the
jury would have the duty to make the underlying factual determi-
nations, including the appropriateness of punitive damages, the
level of reprehensibility of the defendant’s conduct, and the rela-
tive wealth of the defendant.491  The trial judge would then deter-
mine the amount of punitive damages necessary to achieve pun-
ishment and deterrence, while ensuring that the award is not
constitutionally excessive—a determination that is a question of
law.492  The jury’s factual determinations would be afforded defer-
ence under the abuse of discretion standard, while the judge’s
award would be subject to de novo review.493
Further evolution of the due process excessiveness jurispru-
dence may resolve issues regarding the proper role of the jury in
determining punitive damages awards.  Even if the current frame-
work has the consequence of taking punitive damages award de-
terminations away from the jury due to fearful trial judges who
simply order remittiturs rather than face de novo review, the pres-
ent Supreme Court is unlikely to reverse its holding in Cooper.
489. Of course, Cooper proves the opposite by showing that at least some puni-
tive damages awards will survive the abuse of discretion review and fail the de
novo review.  The Ninth Circuit initially upheld the punitive damage under an
abuse of discretion review, Cooper Indus., Inc. v. Leatherman Tool Group, Inc.,
532 U.S. 424, 431 (2001), and subsequently reduced the award under a de novo re-
view after the Supreme Court remanded the case to the circuit court to apply the
heightened standard, Leatherman Tool Group, Inc. v. Cooper Indus., Inc., 285
F.3d 1146, 1152 (9th Cir. 2002).  See supra notes 114-122 and accompanying text.
490. Lisa Litwiller, Has the Supreme Court Sounded the Death Knell for Jury
Assessed Punitive Damages? A Critical Re-Examination of the American Jury, 36
U.S.F. L. REV. 411, 470-71 (2002) (providing an historical summary of punitive
damages and the relative power of the judge and jury in awarding them); see also
Paul Mogin, Why Judges, Not Juries, Should Set Punitive Damages, 65 U. CHI. L.
REV. 179 (1998) (arguing that the power to set punitive damages in federal court
should rest with trial judges, subject to appellate review, rather than with juries).
491. Litwiller, supra note 490, at 470-71.
492. Id. at 470.
493. Id. at 471.
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Subsequent decisions, however, may create additional jury instruc-
tion requirements and may refine how a well-instructed jury’s de-
termination should be reviewed.  Finally, the more radical proposal
discussed above is not inconceivable; purely factual findings could
be reserved for the jury, while judges could be given exclusive
authority to determine the amount of punitive damages awards.494
4. Is the Defendant’s Wealth A Relevant Consideration?  As
previously discussed, the BMW Court articulated three guideposts
to be considered when a court determines whether a punitive dam-
ages award is constitutionally excessive: (1) reprehensibility of the
defendant’s conduct; (2) the ratio of the award to the harm; and (3)
comparison to other sanctions.495  However, neither BMW, Cooper,
nor State Farm states that these are the only guideposts that can be
considered.
In re Exxon Valdez raises the question of whether additional
guideposts can or should be considered when courts conduct their
excessiveness inquiries.  Most notably, In re Exxon Valdez asks
whether the jury can consider the wealth of the defendant.  In addi-
tion, the case raises the closely related question of whether courts
should consider the wealth of the defendant when reviewing the
jury’s punitive damages award to determine whether it is so exces-
sive that it violates the defendant’s substantive due process rights.
Most courts allow the jury to consider the defendant’s wealth
when it determines the amount of punitive damages. 496  Evidence
regarding a defendant’s wealth is introduced to prove whether the
defendant has sufficient financial resources to pay a large award
and to show whether such an award is necessary to punish and de-
ter the defendant.497  Some observers have argued that permitting
juries to consider wealth is unwise, irrational, and unconstitutional
since a defendant should be punished for the harm in question, and
not simply for being wealthy.498  Critics of evidence relating to a de-
494. Indeed, the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals now directs district court
judges to perform a more stringent review upon a motion for remittitur of punitive
damages awards by independently assessing how much a defendant should be
punished when the award rests on a policy judgment as opposed to a factual de-
termination.  Atlas Food Sys. & Serv. v. Crane Nat’l Vendors, Inc. 99 F.3d 587,
594-95 (4th Cir. 1996).
495. BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 575-85 (1996).
496. See Klugheit, supra note 454, at 839.
497. Id.
498. Kenneth S. Abraham & John C. Jeffries, Jr., Punitive Damages and the
Rule of Law: The Role of the Defendant’s Wealth, 18 J. LEGAL STUD. 415, 423
(1989) (“Punishment based on the characteristics of the actor, rather than on spe-
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fendant’s wealth also argue that no greater deterrence is needed
for more wealthy defendants since both wealthy and poor defen-
dants conduct the same cost-benefit analysis when determining
whether or not to engage in an activity, and the threat of liability
will equally deter both.499  On the other hand, those in favor of al-
lowing juries to consider the wealth of a defendant argue that it is
necessary “to assure that a punitive damages award is sufficient to
punish the defendant and deter future wrongful conduct.”500
In Pacific Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. Haslip, the Supreme
Court upheld the guideposts used by the Alabama Supreme Court
to review a jury’s punitive damages award, one of which was “the
‘financial position’ of the defendant.”501  In TXO Production Corp.
v. Alliance Resource Corp., the Supreme Court upheld the jury’s
award of punitive damages after the trial court had instructed the
jury that it could consider the wealth of the defendant as a factor
when determining the amount of punitive damages.502  The Court
noted that the defendant had failed to properly raise the issue of
whether the jury instruction regarding the defendant’s wealth vio-
lated due process.503  In dicta, the Court stated that “the emphasis
on the wealth of the wrongdoer increased the risk that the award
may have been influenced by prejudice against large corpora-
tions.”504  The TXO Court, however, also reiterated its position
from Haslip that the wealth of the defendant is a factor that can be
taken into account when assessing punitive damages.505
cific misconduct, threatens fundamental notions of freedom from government
constraint.”).
499. See Schwartz, supra note 27, at 1022-23; see also Polinsky & Shavell, supra
note 91, at 911 (stating that the wealth of corporate defendants should never be a
factor in assessing punitive damages and should only rarely be a factor with indi-
vidual defendants).
500. Michael J. Pepek, TXO v. Alliance: Due Process Limits and Introducing a
Defendant’s Wealth When Determining Punitive Damages Awards, 25 PAC. L.J.
1191, 1224 (1994).
501. 499 U.S. 1, 22 (1990).
502. 509 U.S. 443, 466 (1993).  For an overview of the TXO decision, see supra
notes 47-49 and accompanying text.
503. TXO Prod. Corp., 509 U.S. at 464.
504. Id.  Others have stated that “consideration of the wealth of large corpora-
tions may only aggravate the problems with jury decisionmaking . . . .” Klugheit,
supra note 454, at 840.
505. TXO Prod. Corp., 509 U.S. at 464.  In a dissenting opinion, Justice
O’Connor accepted that “the defendant’s wealth is a permissible consideration”
for the jury, but warned that “courts must have authority to recognize the special
danger of bias that such considerations create.” Id. at 492 (O’Connor, J., dissent-
ing).
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The BMW Court chose not to articulate the defendant’s
wealth as one of its excessiveness guideposts, even though the Has-
lip Court upheld an excessiveness inquiry that included the defen-
dant’s wealth as a factor.506  Instead, the BMW Court focused on
the substantive due process right which “dictate[s] that a person re-
ceive fair notice not only of the conduct that will subject him to
punishment, but also of the severity of the penalty that a State may
impose.”507  BMW’s wealth was simply not a factor the Court con-
sidered when it sought to determine whether the large punitive
damage award had violated the substantive due process right of fair
notice.  Specifically, the Court stated that “the fact that BMW is a
large corporation rather than an impecunious individual does not
diminish its entitlement to fair notice.”508
In State Farm, the Supreme Court rejected the Utah Supreme
Court’s use of State Farm’s wealth as a justification for the large
punitive damages award.509  While the Court did not reject the
jury’s use of the defendant’s wealth when determining the punitive
damages award and did not expressly state that the defendant’s
wealth has no place in a due process excessiveness inquiry, the
Court reiterated its position from BMW, stating that “[t]he wealth
of a defendant cannot justify an otherwise unconstitutional puni-
tive damages award.”510
Some district courts have seized upon the omission of the de-
fendant’s wealth from BMW’s guideposts and have concluded that
evidence of a defendant’s wealth cannot be offered at trial.511
These courts erroneously fail to distinguish between use of the de-
fendant’s wealth as a consideration in the assessment of punitive
damages, and use of the defendant’s wealth as a guidepost in de-
termining whether a punitive damages award is so excessive that it
violates due process.  Since the Supreme Court has not prohibited
either of these uses of a defendant’s wealth, prohibiting such evi-
dence at trial seems wildly premature absent applicable legislation
or a decision by a higher court.
It is fully consistent to allow evidence of a defendant’s wealth
to be used by the jury when it determines the amount of punitive
506. See Klugheit, supra note 454, at 840 (stating that BMW gives “defendants
at least some basis to argue that their wealth should not be considered at all by the
jury in assessing punitive damages”).
507. BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 574 (1996).
508. Id. at 585.
509. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 123 S. Ct. 1513, 1525 (2003).
510. Id.
511. See, e.g., Pivot Point Int’l, Inc. v. Charlene Prods., Inc., 932 F. Supp. 220,
223 (N.D. Ill. 1996) (Easterbrook, J., sitting by designation).
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damages, yet prohibit reviewing courts from using the same evi-
dence as a guidepost when conducting an excessiveness review.
Evidence of the defendant’s wealth is relevant as the jury deter-
mines the amount necessary to punish and deter a particular de-
fendant.  A court conducting an excessiveness review, however,
must protect the defendant’s substantive due process right to fair
notice and should not be overly concerned with the amount neces-
sary to punish and deter.  If the reviewing court concludes that the
defendant did not have fair notice of the punishment that could be
imposed for the conduct that harmed the plaintiff, the court must
reduce the punitive damages award.  Neither the wealth of the de-
fendant, nor the likelihood that a reduced amount would insuffi-
ciently punish and deter the defendant should change this outcome.
The constitutional maximum punitive damages award in a given
case is based on fair notice, not on notions of what is necessary to
punish and deter the defendant.
5. Should a Defendant’s Expenses Mitigate the Amount of
Punitive Damages?  While BMW’s guideposts have served to focus
the excessiveness inquiry now required to protect the defendant’s
substantive due process right to fair notice, the lack of guidance
provided to lower courts on how to apply the guideposts has cre-
ated conflicts, as the following example demonstrates.  One of the
biggest sources of disagreement between the Ninth Circuit and the
district court concerned how Exxon’s various spill-related expendi-
tures should affect analysis of the BMW guideposts and the extent
to which these expenditures should mitigate the amount of the pu-
nitive damages award.
The Ninth Circuit contended that the spill-related expendi-
tures should be factored into the BMW excessiveness inquiry and
should serve to discount the amount of punitive damages.  When
the Ninth Circuit analyzed the case under BMW’s reprehensibility
guidepost, it stated that Exxon’s pre-trial payments mitigated the
reprehensibility of its conduct.512 The court stated that
“[r]eprehensibility should be discounted if defendants act promptly
and comprehensively to ameliorate any harm they cause in order to
encourage such socially beneficial behavior.” 513  When examining
the ratio guidepost, the Ninth Circuit stated that these pre-trial
payments should not be used as part of the harm estimate for pur-
poses of calculating the ratio “because that would deter settlements
prior to judgment.”514  The Ninth Circuit also reasoned that the
512. Exxon II, 270 F.3d 1215, 1242-43 (9th Cir. 2001).
513. Id. at 1242.
514. Id. at 1244.
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cleanup costs, casualty losses, fines, settlements, and compensatory
judgments “should be considered part of the deterrent already im-
posed” for the spill under the ratio guidepost in order to avoid
over-deterrence.515
The district court rejected the Ninth Circuit’s approach and
concluded that Exxon’s spill-related expenditures should not miti-
gate the amount of the punitive damages award.516  Specifically, the
district court stated that payments made prior to judgment should
be included when calculating the harm side of the ratio.517  The dis-
trict court stated that the Ninth Circuit’s approach would actually
encourage trials and deter settlements.518  In addition, the district
court contended that since the jury had already been permitted to
use Exxon’s spill-related expenditures to mitigate its calculation of
the amount of the punitive damages award, a reviewing court con-
ducting an excessiveness inquiry should not deduct those expendi-
tures a second time in the ratio analysis.519
Since one of the purposes of punitive damages is deterrence, it
is clearly relevant for a jury to consider the amounts a defendant
has paid as a result of its harmful conduct when determining the
appropriate amount of an award.  However, the extent to which a
reviewing court conducting an excessiveness inquiry should use
pre-trial expenditures to reduce the level of reprehensibility of the
defendant’s conduct and to reduce the harm side of the ratio analy-
sis is a more difficult assessment.  The purpose of the excessiveness
inquiry is to determine whether the punitive damages award is so
excessive that it violates the defendant’s substantive due process
right to fair notice.  BMW’s guideposts exist to help determine
whether a defendant had fair notice of the punishment that could
be imposed for the conduct that harmed the plaintiff. Under the
guideposts, when a defendant’s conduct is highly reprehensible,
when the difference between the harm and the punitive damages
award is small, and when comparable sanctions could have been
imposed for the conduct, a reviewing court should conclude that
the defendant’s right to fair notice has not been violated.
Considerations of whether the punitive damages award has re-
sulted in economically optimum deterrence or whether the combi-
nation of pre-trial expenditures and the punitive damages award
have resulted in over-deterrence are distinct from the fair notice
excessiveness inquiry required by BMW and its progeny.  A court
515. Id.
516. Exxon III, 236 F. Supp. 2d 1043, 1060 (D. Alaska 2002).
517. Id.
518. Id. at 1061.
519. Id.
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conducting such a review should not be overly concerned with
whether the jury has determined the precise amount necessary to
deter the defendant’s conduct.  Since punishment is an equal goal
of punitive damages, a reviewing court should not focus exclusively
on saving a defendant from over-deterrence, for, as the Cooper
Court pointed out, society’s interest in punishment and deterrence
may override its interest in economic efficiency.520
The difficulty is that in order to determine the fair notice issue,
a reviewing court must assess the reprehensibility of the defen-
dant’s conduct and calculate the harm that the conduct caused.  Ig-
noring subsequent remedial measures taken by a defendant does
not provide a complete picture of the defendant’s reprehensibility.
A defendant who takes prompt measures to reduce the harm
caused by its conduct is clearly less reprehensible than a defendant
who does nothing.  Similarly, the calculation of the harm caused by
the defendant’s conduct as required under the ratio analysis neces-
sarily involves including some harms and excluding others.
The In re Exxon Valdez jury was instructed that it could de-
cide whether Exxon’s spill-related expenditures properly mitigated
the need for punishment and deterrence.  In other words, the jury
was allowed to use these expenditures to offset its determination of
the appropriate amount of the punitive damages award.  Under
these circumstances, a court conducting an excessiveness review to
determine the fair notice issue should not use the expenditures to
reduce the defendant’s liability for punitive damages under BMW’s
guideposts, since the jury already had a chance to do so.  While
BMW’s guideposts themselves add difficulty, a reviewing court
should attempt to focus on the fair notice issue to the extent possi-
ble and should avoid simply substituting its own subjective notion
of the amount necessary to punish and deter the defendant for that
of the jury.  Under the current due process excessiveness jurispru-
dence, as long as the defendant had fair notice, the award cannot
be deemed unconstitutional, even if the reviewing court concludes
that the award may result in over-deterrence.
VI.  CONCLUSION
In re Exxon Valdez provides an opportunity to examine appli-
cation of the Supreme Court’s recent decisions regarding the sub-
stantive due process right against excessive punitive damages
awards.  Procedurally, the case has progressed during a period of
rapidly evolving due process excessiveness jurisprudence.  The case
520. Cooper Indus., Inc. v. Leatherman Tool Group, Inc., 532 U.S. 424, 439-40
(2001).
111103 CHAMBERS.DOC 12/29/03  2:00 PM
2003] IN RE EXXON VALDEZ 269
raises several questions regarding the effects of that jurisprudence
and points to problematic issues which may lead to further evolu-
tion.
As troublesome aspects of due process excessiveness review
reach the Supreme Court, the Court will undoubtedly continue to
provide additional guidance regarding BMW’s guideposts and the
manner in which they are to be analyzed.  Further guidance, how-
ever, is likely to erode the authority of the states to determine the
allowable scope of punitive damages, to decrease deference appel-
late courts give to trial courts, and to diminish the role of the jury.
The perceived benefits of the excessiveness inquiry—uniformity
and predictability—have not yet materialized.  While the Supreme
Court has succeeded in prescribing a uniform analysis for deter-
mining whether a punitive damages award is constitutionally exces-
sive, the practical application—as illustrated by In re Exxon Val-
dez—has proved problematic.  Whether evolution of the due
process excessiveness jurisprudence will clear up these problems,
or whether the Supreme Court, in its determination to rein in puni-
tive damages awards, will create additional problems through fur-
ther guidance, remains to be seen.
